Anglo-German relations and European politics, 1871-1890 .. by Young, Ruth Frances
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1932
Anglo-German relations and
European politics, 1871-1890 ..
https://archive.org/details/anglogermanrelat00youn
Boston University
'^78.74^
flinlbg? of Slth^ral Arta
Slibrarg
The Gift of i^e Rulhoh
3 78.74-4-
30ST0K IJIJIVERSITY
GRALUATE SCHOOL
Thesis
AKaLO-GSRlvLaK RELATIONS and
EUROPEAN POLITICS, 1871-1890
By
Ruth Frances Young
(A.B., Colby, i950.)
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1932
BOSTON UNrVERSlTY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
U8RARY
6 0 6
IKTRODUCTIOK a ^
The settlement of difficulties by the Congress
of Vienna, which assembled in November 1814, left Germany
nothing more than a loose confederation of thirty-eight
states under the control of old ruling families. During
the next hundred years the development of Central Europe
merged these individual states into a unity under a strong
central government, which gave Germany a place among the
first nations of the world. This marvelous achievement
was the result of a severe striigple and keen diplomatic
manoeuvring on the part of one person in particular, Prince
Bismarck. The balance of power in Europe was destroyed.
England could no longer stand aloof in "splendid isolation."
More and more she became involved in successive European
crises.
This work aims primarily to give a picture of
the relationship which existed between England and Germany
during the years, 1871-1890. One becomes, however, involved
deeper and deeper in European politics, as Bismarck weaves
his threads of entangling alliances: the Dual Alliance,
the Triple Alliance, the Austro-Italian Alliance, the German
Italian Alliance, the Anglo-Italian Austrian Agreement, the
Re-Insurance Treaty between Germany and Russia. Little
v;onder that Bismarck's successors did not understand his
policy nor dare to continue it. Little wonder that we, too,
became entangled in this maze of European events.
m
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AKGLO-GERllAN RELATIOKS and
EUROPEAN POLITICS
1871-1890
I The European Situation at the Close of
the Franco-Prussian V/ar
On January 18, 1871 V/illiam I, King of Prussia,
amidst great pomp and ceremony, v;as proclaimed Emperor of
Germany in the Salle des Glaces at Versailles. "Thus begins
the new political life of Germany." says the London Times of
January 20, 1871, "and whatever may betide, a remarkable
period in the world's history is about to be displayed
before us." Henceforth, the political capital of Continental
Europe, hitherto at Paris or Vienna, was established beyond
a dispute at Berlin. The European State system was remodelled
by the creation of a Central German Empire expressed in the
supremacy of a militarist and industrialized Prussia over
a Germany unified on a federal basis. Each of these two
results was a revolution. In combination, they made a
new Europe and a new world of political thought and action.*
"Europe has lost a mistress and gained a master,"
said one statesman. Disraeli, in a similar vein, states,
"it is no common war like the war between Russia and
Austria. This war represents the German revolution, a
greater political event than the French Revolution.
*Robertson, C.G., Bismarck, P. 1,
#
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Not a single primciple in the management of our foreip-n
affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to
six months ago, any longer exists. There is not a dip-
lomatic tradition which has not been cY.ept away. You
have a new world, new influences at wori£, new and unJcnown
objects with which to cope. The balance of power in Europe
has been destroyed and the country which suffers most, and
feels the effects of this great change most, is England."*
From 1870 it is true that British statesmen,
like all others, had to shape their policies in accordance
with their views of the future position of Germany.
Bismarck told Lord Odo Russell, English Ambassador to
Berlin, that his ambition for Germany was an alliance with
England and Austria, but he did not see his way to it yet.
The advantages of such an alliance are clearly obvious
as it would guarantee for Germany all that she had won and
perpetuaie^French isolation.**
During the Franco -Prussian War, Russia did not
co-operate, as Disraeli had hoped, with Great Britain in a
watchful and armed neutrality to impose peace on France and
Germany at a suitable moment. Instead she took advantage of
the critical position of France and the comparative helpless-
ness of Great Britain to notify the European Powers that
she would hold herself no longer bound by the Black Sea
*lvToneypenny & Buckle, Vol. II, P. 473-474, Abridged Edition
**Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, P. 54
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neutralization clauses of the Treaty of Paris. These
terms France and Great Britain, as victorious allies in the
Crimean War, had forced her to accept. Lord Granville,
with the aid of Bismarck, got Russia to submit this claim,
as stated in the Gortchakov Circular, to a conference of
Powers in London. At this London Conference, by a special
protocol, it was agreed that it was, "an essential principle
of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself
from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations
thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers
by means of an amicable arrangement." Bismarck's interests
here may clearly be seen in the danger to Germany of another
European V/ar and in the vital importance of peace to the
reconstruction of Germany and Russia.*
These were the main factors determining Germany's
policy in attempting to avoid a war between England and
Russia. These led him to support England and peac& against
Gortchakov and his Circular, and at the same time to
attempt to procure political advantages for his moral support.
After signing Granville *s Protocol, the Plenipotentiaries
proceeded to abrogate, in accordance with Russia's demands, the
three clauses of the Treaty of Paris which provided for
the neutralization of the Black Sea.**
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. II, Chap. IX
**Ibid, Vol. II, pp 25-25
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The hatred and fear of Russia, which had begun to die
down after the Crimean War in the Near East, received again
a new stimulus. The boundaries of England and Russia were
ever drawing nearer each other in Asia, a fact which
England felt threatened the security of the Indian Empire
and her commercial interests in China. She also dreaded
the construction of a strong navy in the Black Sea which
would also be in control of the Straits. In this world
policy, England and Russia were rivals, and the nearer
they approached each other in Asia, the more bitter the
hostility.*
After 1871, peace was the supreme need for the
Empire. Germany had imposed, by war with France, the
conditions in which she desired to live with her neighbors.
Therefore, she nov^ wished the maintenance of these conditions,
and their development into a permanent system. Thus the
supreme object of Germany's policy, which was controlled
by Bismarck until 1890, was the maintenance of the peace
of Europe. He set to work after 1871 to convince the leading
Continental States that it was to their interest to keep
France isolated. One fear that haunted Bismarck until the
end of his career in office was an alliance between Franee
and Russia in which Germany could not be a third partner.**
To accomplish his purposes, Bismarck turned first to Russia.
*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill P. 52
** Robertson, G. G. Bismarck, ?. 329
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In June, 1871, the two Emperors, William I and Alexander II
met at Berlin to exchange friendly greetings. More definite
progress was made in the following August v;hen after the
visit of the Czar to Berlin, the German and Austrian Empefors
met at various times in August and September at Ischl,
Gastein, and Salzburg. Soon after, Beust, Austrian Chancellor,
resigned and was succeeded by Andrassy. This change of
Chancellors assured a nev/ relationship with Germany, as
Andrassy was more friendly to the new German Empire.*
Bismarclc won his first victory in diplomacy as
Chancellor in September, 1872 when the three Emperors of
Austria, Russia, and Germany, accompanied by their Chancellors,
met at Berlin to discuss the basis of future co-operation
in European affairs. No formal treaty was concluded at
this time, but the understanding was intimate and complete.
All the statesmen at this interview desired to avoid making
any definite commitments. However, an agreement was reached
upon outstanding questions and upon the general aims towards
which the foreign policy of the three Powers would be directed
in the future. This agreement was known as the Drei-Kaiser
Bund. However, it was not a Bund or an alliance, but only
a monarchical entente of good-will. It rested wholly on
the friendship of the Emperors and their mutual confidence.**
In spite of this monarchical agreement, Russia
was suspicious about Austria's designs in the Balkans, but
*Dawson, W. H. Vol. II, P. 86-87
**Ibid. Vol. II, P. 88

Andrassy assured Gortchakov that Austria's policy was
a defensive one. Austria wished nothing more than to be on
good terms with Serbia, but "the extension of her frontiers,
which was dreamt of by the adherents of the so-called
'Greater Serbia' idea, and which would embrace Bosnia-
Herzegovina could not be reconciled with the standpoint of
Austria-Hungary, a portion of whose subjects belonged to
the same race and might, therefore, become imbued with
similar aspirations." Austria thus desired the preservation
of the Ottoman Empire. The two governments then agreed to
observe a policy of non-intervention in the Balkans and to
work for the maintenance of the status quo.*
Andrassy was also anxious to remove suspicion from
the minds of the English. Speaking to Lord Odo Russell, he
expressed his sympathy for England. "He sincerely regretted
that her neutrality stood in the way of that imtimate and
active co-operation with Austria that had been the dream of
his life. Kow he felt that the existence of Austria depended
on a cordial alliance with Germany."** These agreements
aroused considerable anxiety in London and, as a counter
move, a British squadron was sent to greet Thiers to express
Englands goodwill toward France.
The meeting of the three Emperors was an important
fact in the reformation of European politics after 1866.
There is seen here a drawing together of Germany and
*Langer, P. 21-22
**Docilmients diplomat iques francais, No. 157, quoted by
Langer, ?. 23
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Austrla, and Austria and Russia, but all in uncertainty.
Each one was suspicious of the other. Andrassy courted
Bismarck, and at the same time expressed his affection for
the English. Bismarck accepted the advances of Andrassy,
yet was careful not to estrange England. England was
genuinely distrubed and openly demonstrated her interests
in France.
At St. Petersburg in May 1873, V/illiam I , accompanied
by Bismarck and Moltke, worked out a military convention with
the Tsar and his field-marshal, von Berg. This provided
that if either of the contracting parties were attacked by
another European Power, the other should come to the aid
of its ally with two hundred thousand men.*
A more general treaty called the Drei-Kaiser
Abkommen was substituted for this military convention to
which Emperor Frances Joseph subscribed, namely, "to prevent
anyone from succeeding in separating them in the field of
principles which they regard as alone capable of assuring,
and, if necessary, of imposing the maintenance of the peace
of Europe against all subversions, from whatever quarter
they may come. In case an aggression coming from a third
Power should threaten to compromise the peace of Europe,
their Majesties would mutually agree to come to a preliminary
understanding between themselves, without seeking or con-
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. I, No. 127
c
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tracting new alliances, in order to agree as to the line of
conduct to be followed in oomraon. If, as a result of this
understanding, a military action should become necessary,
it would be governed by a special convention to be concluded
between their Majesties."*
William I accepted this new agreement in October,
1873. Bismarck *s attitude regarding this new undertaking is
uncertain. It has been suggested that he refused to sign
them himself because they were too anti-English. At the
time of his visit to St. Petersburg in 187S, he spoke to
the English ambassador of his anxiety to maintain intimate
relations, and asserted that the League of the Three Emperors
was not inconsistent with an understanding with England.
This somewhat helped to remove English suspicions of German
policy.
A more real rapprochement took place between
Italy and Germany. France maintained wa. unfriendly attitude
toward Italy *s movement toward unity. It was likewise found
that the restoration of the Papacy would be attempted with
the aid of France. In November 1872, an Italian Statesman
expressed frankly that, "Not only sentiment and community
of interests, but oomraon enemies connect us with Germany....
We should be culpable if we did not seek to maintain the
best relations with the German government and people." **
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. I, No. 129
**Langer, W. L.,P. 26
c
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In September 1872, Victor Emmanuel paid a visit
not only to Berlin, but Vienna. In Vienna, the King was
assured that Austria would not support the papal claims,
and in Berlin, it was promised that Germany would not allow
an attacJc upon Italy, No definite written agreement was
concluded, but Italy was also include'' as an associate of
the group of powers which had joined in the League of the
Three Emper.ors.
Although the agreement of the four Emperors
was probably not intended as a demonstration against France,
except on the part of Bismarck, its effect was to leave
France without allies and to magnify her isolated position.
France at first, busy with reconstruction, was no source of
danger. By 1873, under Thiers, the huge indemnity imposed
by the Peace of Frankfurt was paid and the German troops
withdrawn. There was growing steadily in France an under-
current of suspicion that Germany's attitude was aggressive.
It was the relations with France at this time which partly
determined the scope of the Army Bill introduced in the
Reichstag in February, 1874. The military preparations of
France were also increased with feverish haste which led
Germany to issue a letter of protest to the French Government
and a warning collectively to the Powers.*
*j}ie Grosse Politik, Vol. I, Chap. VI
c
-lo-
ll Disraeli and a New Active Pat?ticipation in
Continental Affairs.
Such was the international situation that
Disraeli found on his feturn to power in 1874, namely, the
dominance of Germany and of Germany's master, Bismarck.
France had somewhat recovered from the shock suffered in
1870 and once more a suspicion between her and Germany
was developing, as the antagonism between Russia and England
increased
.
Bismarck had come to disregard England, under the
Gladstone ministry, as an important factor in European
affairs. Disraeli at once -expressed that he was in accord
with the Queen, "thet every means should be used to prevent
such a monstrous iniquity as a war."* Lord Derby gave
formal assurances to the French Government in this sense.
This shows the depth of English distrust in the attitude
Germany was taking toward France. The British Government
offered its services as a friendly mediator and invited the
other Powers to use their influence for the maintenance of
peace
.
On May 8, the British Government addressed a
dispatch to Lord Odo Russell which was circulated in Paris,
Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Rome, instructing him to use all
his powers to put an end to the misunderstanding which had
*Moneypenny & Buckle, New and revised edition. Vol. II,
P. 763-764
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arisen between Franee and Germany. It is worthy of note
that when this dispatch was communicated to the Austrian
Government that that Government alone declined to instruct
their ambassador at Berlin in the manner desired on the
ground that it would irritate Bismarck, Tsar Alexander,
on a visit to Berlin at this time, tooi: the opportunity to
discuss the preservation of peace. Bismarck, in his talk
with Gortchakov, asserted that he was actuated only by
the most pacific motives. Lord Odo Russell, being more
tactful in hissconversation, did not arouse the anger of
Bismarck as Gortchakov had. The German Chancellor thanked
Hussell"for the very friendly offer which he highly
appreciated as a proof of goodwill and confidence on the
part of Her Majesty's Government."* Bismarck was extremely
angry when he discovered through certain remarks of Gortchakov
that other governments had been invited to take part in the
action toward the amaintenance of peace.
As a climax to the whole affair, Gortchakov
telegraphed to Russian representatives abroad, "now peace
is assured." Bismarck protested strongly that Germany never
for a moment had entertained such intentions as attributed
to her. There was, without doubt, a menace of war in 1875,
but it is doubtful that Bismarck desired such action unless
forced by the militarist faction. Germany's ill-feeling
at this intervention is expressed in a reference from the
documents of the Foreign Office. "Had England revealed a
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. I, pp. 272,277
r
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tenth part of this interest in 1870 in the attaot of France
against Germany, that she has developed at this untimely
moment, the whole bloody war would not have taken place."*
Which of the two countries, England or Russia,
contributed most to the preservation of peace is debatable.
Disraeli felt that England had been especially fortunate
in her policy, "for what we did involved no risk and cost
no trouble, while it has given us the appearance of having
helped more than we did, to bring about the result."**
Lord Lyons found on his return to Paris the
French overflowing with gratitude for the exertions of
Her Majesty's Government in favor of peace. '^**
The war scare of 1875 had a still deeper signifi-
cance for England. It was recognized both at home and
abroad that England had reverted to the traditions of her
foreign policy before Gladstone's premiership. Bismarck
realized that he had to deal now in England with a people
who were ready to pursue an active foreign policy. For
twenty years Disraeli, both as a statesman and wr-tier,
had been educating his party to the recognition of Great
Britain's wider imperial destiny. Great Britain's influence
should again be felt and for England should the place in
European politics be regained which Bismarck now usurped.
There was now a reorientation of Great Britain's foreign
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. I No. 210
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. V P. 423-424
***Lord Newton, Lord Lyons. Vol. II, P. 80
c
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policy and a new emphasis on her relations with the several
powers. A new forward policy, especially in India, was
carried out by the appointment of a British Resident to be
stationed first at Herat, and later at Kabul. This policy
increased Russian aggression and rivalry in Central Asia
and Afghanistan.*
In the latter part of the year 1875 Disraeli
managed another "coup" adding to the rivalry and feeling
against Russia by the purchase of shares in the Suez Canal
from the Khedive for four million pounds sterling, making
England the ma^or shareholder. From every country but Russia
came congratulations. Immediately after the purchase, the
British Government took its first step toward intervention
in Egypt by sending a British expert to inquire into the
tangled financial situation of the country. Disraeli wrote
at this time, "The Faery (Queen Victoria) was most excited
about Suez, said what she liked most was, it was a blow at
Bism.arck, referring, I apprehend, to his insolent declarations
that England had ceased to be a political power."**
The opening of the Suez Canal meant for England, with
her world -v/ide economic and imperial policy, a vital interest
in the Near East. To control this route or to prevent the
predominance of any other Power was henceforth an aim of Brit-
ish policy, and consequently, the endeavor to prevent
Russia from reaching Constantinople and the Mediterranean.
*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, P. 78
Buckle, Vol. II, P. 490. New and revised edition
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III The Eastern Question
As soon as the war scare of April, 1875 had been
dispelled, the Eastern Question became the center of attention,
llutual Jealousies among the Christians of the Blakans aided
Turkey in obstinate resistance to all relaxation ofcontrol
over her subjects. Turkish misrule and tyranny in the Balkan
Peninsula became more and more of European interest. Hot
only was Austria interested, but Russia was vitally interested.
The possibility of friction and distrubanoe between these two
great powers increased in direct ratio as each sought to
strengthen their influence in the Balkan States.*
England had no direct interest in the respective
Claims of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, or Roumania, but indirectly
they were of great importance as they involved the future of
the Turkish Empire and with that the control of the road to
India. England's road to India was not yet safeguarded by
her occupation of Egypt. Her road lay through regions subject
to the Sultan's suzerainty, for his influence was paramount
throughout Mohammedan Asia. His government could not, there-
fore, be allowed to come under the control of any stronger
power.** If there was to be a Russian advance, on Constan-
tinople, it was natural that this would also be opposed by
Austria. England would be certain to co-operate v/ith Austria
as they were both in favor of keeping Turkey alive as long
as possible so that the national aspirations of the Balkans
might be kept within bounds and thus within immediate control.
*Brand enburg , E.?. 6-7
**Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, P. 79
c
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Reforms would be necessary to satisfy the demands of the
Christians, and yet insure the. continuance of the Turkish
Empire. Andrassy's aim was Austria's self-preservation,
and, if the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of his
Balkan policy, he sought aggrandizement not for his own
sake, but as a safeguard against disintegration. His fear
was the creation on A^istria's frontier of a strong state.*
A rising in the Balkans would involve the intervention
of Austria and Russia. If this intervention paved the way
for a Russian advance on Constantinople, naturally this
would be opposed by England as well as by Austria. What
would be the position of Germany, the strongest and most
efficient state on the Continent? Germany's attitude towards
the Balkan Question was one of entire detachment and freedom
from sentiment. Bismarck would rather have seen the Christian
subjects of the Sult&n governed well than badly, but the only
question that was vital to him was the interests of Germany,
and those interests required the maintenance of good relations
between all three Powers of the LeaguE.**
It was hoped that the Crimean War would secure the
peace of Europe for at least twenty-five years. It was also
hoped that as a result of this, Turkey would take to heart
the need for internal reforms. Little or nothing was done,
however, and bad political conditions only became worse.
Revolt was the only means to give vent to these pent-up
discontents, which took place first in Bosnia and Herzegovina
in July, 1875.***
*Cambridge, History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, P. 92
**Ibid, Vol. Ill, P. 93
**Ce»il, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, P. 79
€
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The local revolt threatened to become a general
Balkan uprising as the Porte's promises of reform failed to
impress the insurgents. While plans of intervention were
being discussed at Vienna by Germany, Russia, and Austria,
the Sultan removed the need for intervention when, on the
first of December he sanctioned a series of reforms, which
were promulgated by a firman of December the tv/elfth. The
deliberations of the three Chancellors were made known to
the other Powers who were signatories of the Treaty of Paris
of 1856, in a note known as the Andrassy Kote. This demanded
complete religious freedom, abolition of tax farming, a
guarantee that the revenue of the provinces should be used
for local needs, improvement of agrarian conditions, and
finally, the establishment of a mixed commission composed
equally of Mohammedans and Christians, to supervise the working
of these reforms. The whole action of this Andrassy Note
failed however, because the insurgents themselves rejected the
concessions on the basis that they were inadequate without
a guarantee by the Powers.*
Disraeli agreed to support the Note, probably
fearing that if Great Britain refused to ^oin the Eastern
Powers, they would act without her.**
The acceptance by the Powers of the Andrassy Kote
^ve diplomacy a brief resting spell. The Porte, as usual,
was profuse with promises; time was necessary to prove the
outsome. In the interval Bismarck took the opportunity to
*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, P. 96
**Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 16-19
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make overtures to England for common action. Because of the
antagonistic interests of Russia and Austria in the Balkans,
Bismarck, without doubt, saw that a choice between the tv/o
would be necessary sooner or later. Bismarck regarded the
existence of the Austrian Empire as a primary German interest,
but also foresaw that if he turned his back on Russia, Russia
would appeal to France. This would leave Germany with enemies
on two fronts.
The purchase of the Suez Canal by England, her
participation in the war menace of 1675 showed to Bismarck a
growing interest, on the part of England in European international
relations. To provide for the possibility of Russia's desertion
against his will, Bismarck approached the Ambassador at Berlin,
Lord Odo Russell, on January 2, 1875. Bismarck expressed the
desire that there should be a "frank and frequent" interchange
of ideas with the English Cabinet so that Germany might formu-
late her policy accordingly. Lord Odo Russell, in the report
of this conversation with Bismarck to the governnent, expressed
the opinion that Bismarck was sincere in what he said about
an understanding with England. Lord Derby, in reply, expressed
a desire that there should be co-operation on the part of
England with Germany in Turkish affairs, but made no definite
answer.*
3^ little later Bismarck suggested as a feasible
solution, a settlement on the basis of the acquisition of
Bosnia by Austria; Bessar&bla by Russia; and England to be
given security in respect to the Suez Canal. On February 1
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. II, P. 2E7. Moneypenny & Buckle,
Vol. VI, ?p. 29-22
c
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Lord Odo Russell had another long talk with Bismarck in the
report of which he wrote, "Prince Bismarck spoke earnestly
and impressively of the timely importance he attached to an
understarjding between our two governments. He begged I would
again assure Your Lordship that since Germany has no direct
interests in the East, he is v^filling to further the interests
of the friends of Germany v^ho will support him in maintaining
the peace of Europe. Believing as he does that England is
the Power most directly and sincerely interested in the main-
tenance of peace, he anxiously desires and solicits a thorough
understanding with Her Majesty's Government, so as to be well
prepared before complications arise, to give his full support
to the peace policy of England in the East. England desires
and Germ.any requires peace, while Austria and Russia have
conflicting interests in the East, which may at any moment
lead to sudden and serious differences between them, when
Germany, unable to agree with both, or to stand aloof and be
neutral, may have to take sides; and in so doing a previous
knowledge of the viev^s of Her Majesty's Government would enable
him, by adopting those views and making them his own, to secure
beforehand the moral support of England, in seeking to keep the
peace between Austria and Russia in Turkey."^
Bismarck was probably sincere in his earnest desire
to maintain peace. He dreaded the moment when France should
no longer be isolated in the diplomatic world. This would
*Russell Dispatch (unpb) Feb. 1, 1876, quoted by Langer,
on P. 78
c
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probably happen as soon as Austria and Russia came to blows
in the Balkans, and when Germany would be forced to choose
between the two. Germany had other interests, also, in the
Balkans, which were just beginning to develop. This is seen
in a letter from Billow to Mtinster, January 4, 1876, "Russia
will probably demand compensation in Bessarabia. Roumania
would thus lose the m.ouths of the Danube, a loss more serious
to Germany than England, as German trade there is considerable."
There was a growing ambition to increase Germ.an influence at
Constantinople. Bismarck, while encouraging- the deepening
German interests in Constantinople and in Turkey, kept his
eyes on Western Europe, namely, Great Britain and France.'^
The Queen, Disraeli, and Lord Russell were enthusiastic
over the proposals, while Lord Derby doubted the sincerity
of Bismarck's offer and decided to meet the Chancellor's
overtures with reserve, yet without making any definite com-
mitment or decisive answer. Therefore, he wrote to Russell,
pointing out that any disturbance in the territorial 'status
quo* would be "inadvisable and dangerous." England desired
no * exclusive alliances.' Her principal object was the
maintenance of the peace, which might under certain circumstances
be promoted by "concerted action" and a "cordial understanding"
between England and Germany. This would be possible when
Bismarck's motives were better known. Russell was, thereupon,
instructed to invite Bismarck to reveal his intentions and
motives.**
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. II, ?. 229
**Derby to Russell, Feb, 12 and 16, 1876 (unpub.) mentioned
by Langer, P. 79-80
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This answer surprised Bismarck who had, as a disinter-
ested Power only, offered to support the English peace program-
All he had asked for was the opportunity of exchanging ideas
confidentially with the English Government in case of a crisis,
England and Germany were the two Powers best able to prevent
mischief. "England had a legitimate right to the road to India,
which Germany cordially supported, and both wished for nothing
but peace in the East." If quarrels should arise, the plan
to be used "consisted equally in agreeing and working cordially
together to maintain the peace of Europe, not by upholding the
status quo, but by amicably settling what should be done v;ith
Turkey to satisfy the Powers concerned without going to war
about it." All Bismarck had desired for the time being was
"the power to communicate freely and frankly with Your Majesty
when he saw rocks ahead, and the assurance that he might reckon
on the co-operation of Her Majesty's Government in trying to
steer clear of them.""^
It is evident that Bismarck desired especially to
prevent Great Britain from active participation in case of a
war between Russia and Turkey. It was obvious to Bismarck
that the road to India would, in British eyes, become insecure,
if Russia took possession of Constantinople. Thus he hoped that
an undisturbed position in Egypt would reconcile Great Britain
to such an arrangement, if it were impossible to check Russia's
advance southward. Representations were constantly reaching
*Russell to Derby, Feb. 19, 1876, (unpub.) quoted by Langer
P. 80
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"^h^ Queen "that Berlin had no special interest in the Eastern
Question, and only oo-operated Y/ith St. Petersburg and Vienna
because of the agreement between the three Emperors in 1872,
under which all important political questions were to be
discussed as far as possible *a trois*; that Germany under
Bismarck was anxious for co-operation with England, that if
England would take the lead, Germany would follow."*
Editors of the archives of the German Foreign
Office deny that Bismarck's advances to England meant an
alliance. Bismarck had instructed Kiinster, the German Ambass-
ador at London, to find out "what England's policy will be,
if we get into trouble with Russia."** This does not have
the significance which many attribute to it, but it reveals
an approach nearer to England on the part of Bismarck. V/ith
the passing of the danger, negotiations were dropped with
little possibility of resumption on the displacement of Lord
Beaconsfield by Gladstone in 1880. These do not mean that
Bismarck had made the choice between England and Russia. He
v/as merely providing for the possibility of a break-up of
the League of the Three Emperore, v;hen Russia would no longer
be a partner.
IV The Eastern Question, Part II
In the Balkans, affairs had reached a climax. On May
the German and French consuls were murdered at Salonica as the
insurrection of the Balkan peoples continued with increased fer
*lfloneypenny & Buckle, Ke?/ & revised edition, Vol. II. P. 904
**German documents, I, pp. 22-23 (E.T.S. Lugdale translation)
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ocity. The situation had become so critical that a meeting of
the foreign ministers of the three Empires was immediately
arranged for May 11-14 to meet at Berlin. The result of this
conference was the Berlin I.!eraorandum of May 13, 1676. This
proclaimed the complete unity of the three Imperial Powers,
Germany, Austria, and Russia, in regard to the Eastern Q,uestion.*
The Berlin Note was a forceful, bolder restatement of the
Andrassy Rote. Turkey was to conclude an armistice of two
months with the insurgents. An attempt at reconciliation was to
be made during this interval by the application of the
general principles of the Andrassy Note. T!aterials were to be
furnished by the Porte for the reconstruction of houses and
fihurches which had been destroyed; relief was to be distributed
for the poor and homeless; Turkish troops were to be concentrated
in a few specific places in order to avoid collisions; the
consuls or delegates of the Powers were to preside over the
application of reforms. If the two months' armistice passed
without the Powers attaining the objects desired, "the three
Imperial Courts are of the opinion that it would become necessary
to supplement 'efficacious measures' as might appear to be
demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil
and prevent its development." This final threat was felt to be
incompatible with Great Britain's policy to maintain the integ-
rj ty and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Partly because of
this, Great Britain refused to sanction the Berlin Note
although France and Italy readily accepted.**
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. II, P. 29 (note)
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, ?. 23-24
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This decision was perhaps influenced "by Elliot,
English ambassador at Constantinople, who was extreinly
suspicious of Russian intervention in any form. His policy was
to obtain reforms from the Sultan independently of foreign
action. This rejection helped to encourage the obstinacy of
Turkey. At any rate, from this time on- it was impossible
to shaJce the Sultan in his belief that Great Britain supported
her. This faith encouraged the Porte to oppose the collective
pressure of the Powers. Gladstone and other prominent states-
men believed that the Cabinet under Lord Beaconsfield had
made a great mistake in its refusal to adopt the Berlin
Memorandum, on the basis that it broke up the Concert of
Europe. Besides, it gave encouragement to the Porte, which
was opposed to consideration of the oppressed Christian
nationalities. The Government was, without doubt, at fault
for failing to have provided an alternative or at least to
have advocated the summoning of a conference.*
Disraeli objected to the Note on the ground that
it favored the insurgents too much; that an armistice would
give the rebels time to strengthen their position. Likewise,
it was doubted whether the Turkish Government could find the
money to furnish the refugees with homes and food. "The
distribution of relief by such a commission as is contemplated
would be little better than a system of indiscriminate
aim-giving." "The concentration of the Turkish troops in
certain places would be delivering up the whole country to
*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, P. 98
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anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain
their arms." -"Furthermore, the consular supervision
would reduce the authority of the Sultan to nullity."
Above all, the concluding paragraph was thoroughly inacceptable
"for it could not be supposed that the insurgents would
accept any terms of pacification from the Porte in face of
the declaration that if the insurrection continued after
the armistice, the Powers would intervene further."*
More general considerations formed the basis of
the English refusal, however. Disraeli looked upon the meeting
at Berlin with distrust. Moreover, the tactless method
in which the program was presented to the ambassador, with
an answer demanded in two days, enraged the English minister.
"It is almost a mockery for them to talk of a desire that the
Powers should 'act in Concert' and then exclude France, Italy,
and England from their deliberations, and ask us by telegraph
to say 'Yes' or 'No' to the proposition which we have never heard
discussed 1^**
Gortchakov likewise was angered, but for a different
reason. He believed that as a result of the English refusal,
"the insurrection would assume much larger proportions, and a
flame would be kindled in Bulgaria, Epirus, Thessaly, and
Albania, which the Porte, with its weakened resources, would
be unable to extinguish, and the Christian Powers of Europe,
awakened by public opinion to the call of humanity, would have
to interpose to arrest the effusion of blood."***
*Moneypenny 5- Buckle, Vol. VI, P. E4
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, pp. 22-24
***Langer, P. 83
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Bismarok, however, was pleased with the attitude
of Londor , which marked England's return to an active policy
and which seemed to offer itself as a counterweight to Russia^
Early in June he reopened discussions with England, although
indirectly. Disraeli replied that he was "ready to act with
Prince Bismarck," but that "at this particular moment. Your
Majesty's Ministers have nothing to propose in the way of
pacificatory measures."* Disraeli also was satisfied with
the results of the refusal to sanction the Berlin Memorandum.
The support of the Cabinet had put England back on the polit-
ical map of Europe. "All the great Powers seem anxious to
defer to England, and something like the old days of our
Authority appears to have returned."**
On May 30 the Sultan, Abdul Aziz, was deposed,
being replaced by his nephew, Murad II, who also was dethroned
August 31. V/ith the accession of Abdul Kamid II, the Berlin Memo
randum was withdravm and the new Sultan allowed the opportunity
to voluntarily introduce the needed reforms.
The efforts of the Powers to maintain peace were
unsuccessful, Serbia declared war on Turkey June 30. Montenegro
followed suit on July 1. Disraeli was determined to pursue a
policy of strict neutrality, except, if it were possible to
offer friendly mediation to bring the fighting to an end.
"We undertook, undoubtedly, twenty years ago to guarantee the
sick man against murder, but v.e never undertook to guarantee
him against suicide or sudden death."***
*Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. II, P. 905 e</;j--i-j'
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. II, P. 909
***Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. II, P. 908-909
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Gortchakov, in the hope of checking this war,
proposed that the provinces should be granted autonomy under
Turkish suzerainty. A reconciliation of the Powers regarding
these proposals was obtained in a Conference betv/een the Russian
and Austro-Hungarian Emperors at Reichstadt July 8. The
results of this Conference were, that if the Christian provinces
succeeded in obtaining a victory over Turkey, Serbia, and
Montenegro should, receive an increase of territory, and the
greater part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be annexed by
Austria. Russia was to acquire Bessarabia and territory in Asia
Minor. Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Albania to become independent;
Thessaly and Crete to be added to Greece; and Constantinople
to become a free city.*
Both Austria and Russia left this meeting v/ell
satisfied, but they now had the opposition of England to face.
Discussions in England had assumed a martial spirit, since
it was the belief of many that this disturbance in Serbia and
Ji'iontenegro was inspired by Russia. Opinion, however, immediately
changed on the news of the Bulgarian massacres.*'^
In the first few weeks of May, an uprising had
taken place in the remote provinces of Bulgaria. The Turkish
suppression of this was ruthless and cruel. The first
detailed report of these Bulgarian atrocities appeared in the
London Daily Ke7i/s of June 23, Y^hich gave a very lurid account
of the happening. The report from Elliott at Constantinople
merely stated that there has been "cruelty and in some places
* Pribram, Vol. II, P. 189-191
**Cecii, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, P. 80 also A.C.
Coolidge, P. 95-97
!
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brutality."* Public feeling, however, was constantly
being arousefl by recurrent stories of the horrors inflicted
by the Turks. Disraeli complained to Lord Derby of the
inefficiency of the Foreign Office to supply him vdth adequate
or ample reports. V/alter Baring was sent to investigate the
facts and reported that the manner in which the uprising was
suppressed was extremely ruthless, fixing the number of
Bulgarian victims at twelve thousand.** Gladstone came forth
on September 6 to lead the agitation over the Bulgarian
atrocities with his pamphlet on the Bulgarian Horrors, which
did its Gladstonian best to discredit the government under
Disraeli. This made a bitter attack on the English government
for its support in the maintenance of Turkish independence and
integrity as opposed to giving assistance to the Christian
subjects.***
The Russians naturally believed that England would
be unable to pursue a policy hostile to Russia since the many
demonstrations in favor of the Bulgarians had taken place
in England. Russia took this opportunity to organize a crusade
against Turkey. England, because of pressure from public
opinion, was forced to follow the Russian program and demand
peace on the basis of the 'status quo ante bellum', administrative
autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina with a similar arrangement
for Bulgaria. Disraeli saw the need of coming to some agreement
with Russia concerning active intervention in the Eastern
*Cambridre History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill, P. 104
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, ?. 47
***Morley: Life of Gladstone, Vol. II, P. 551-552
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Q,uestion. The policy/ of non-intervention had failed and if
a solution of the prohlem was to be arranged, England should
assume the leadership, so Lord Beaconsfield thought.
"Constantinople with an adequate district should be neutralized
and made a free port in the custody and under the guardianship
of England, as the Ionian Isles were.*
On September 1, 1876, Turkey proposed peace to
Serbia on the basis that the Prince of Serbia should renew
his homage at Constantinople; certain Serbian fortresses were
to be occupied by Turkish troops; the Serbian army to be
limited to ten thousand men; the Serbian militia to be entirely
disbanded; and, finally, Serbia to pay either an increased
tribute or a war indemnity.
These terms were acceptable to none of the Pov;ers.
Serbia appealed to the Powers for mediation, and the British
Government at last decided upon independent action, refusing
the Russian proposals of occupation. England urged an armistice
of not less than six weeks upon the Porte and proposed to the
other Powers that a European Conference should be summoned as
soon as hostilities should cease. The Turk's reply to this
was, that a six weeks' armistice was too short, and advocated
a truce of five or six months. Serbia and Russia refused to
accept a half years' armistice, insisting that they could not
tolerate a Turkish occupation through the winter. Lord Derby
now appealed to Bismarck to use his influence in order to obtain
some compromise, but Bismarck replied that although the German
*Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 52
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Government had no objection to an armistice of six months,
he could for force the othf.r Powers to accept it. The Tsar
on October 31, issued an ultimatum of forty-eight hours
demanding an armistice of six weeks between Turkey and Serbia.
As a result of this strong action the Porte was forced to
yield. The Porte had refused to agree to an armistice probably
in hopes of evading a European Conference which would discuss
the terms of peace.*
The Pov^ers saw that definite action would eventually
be necessary in the East. Russia was the firtt to sound the
German Chancellor as to his attitude. Austria, feerful of
Russian designs in the Balkans, had done likewise. England,
too, now followed suit. Disraeli was alarmed by the news of
the projected action of Russia in Bulgaria. This action, if
carried out, would seriously affect England's position by
threatening the road to the East. Russia could then easily
advance by the way of Constantinople and Asia Minor to attack
the Suez Canal from Syria. The English fleet in such an
attack v;ould be of little value, as Disraeli ever emphasized.
"Our strength is on the sea. Constantinople is the key of
India, and not Egypt and the Suez Canal," Disraeli even
considered sending a fleet to Constantinople and the Dardan-
elles, but Lord Derby was opposed.**
On October 16 the London Times published an article
stating, "The best security for Peace, in the first instance,
is the firm attitude of a great military Power like Germany, and
in the next, a cordial alliance between her and England for the
*Langer, P. 95-97
**Moneypenny cS: Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 84
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purpose of making the requisite changes in Turkey ... .By a
single ¥;ord he (Bisraarck) may save Eiirope from calamities
Ahich which those of all his own wars could seem slight; and his
responsibility is as vast as his power." The article continues,
"Prince Bismarck has more than once been able to determine
v/hether there should be peace or war in Europe; but we doubt
whether he ever before held so much poV(?er for good or evil as he
does at this moment. Prince Bismarck is the one man who can
avert catastrophe. It is not too late to keep back Russia, and
if any country can thus save the world from a trem.endous war,
it is Germany. She has the power to comple at least the accep-
tance of a truce, and it depends on Prince Bismarck whether that
power will be used. If Prince Bismarck will only keep the
sword of Russia in its sheath, England and Germany could then
powerfully help each other in imposing the necessary terms on
the Porte."
It is not known whether this article w&s inspired by
Beaconsfield , but on the following day, he wrote to Lofd
Derby, "What is we could negotiate a treaty with Germany to
maintain the present status quo generally? This v^ould make
us easy about Constantinople, and relieve Bismarck of his bug-
bear, the eventual alliance of England and France, and the loss
of his tvv'o captured provinces."* Here is the germ of the policy
brought into action by Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin
later, and continued by Lord Salisbury.
Bismarck was at this time in retirement at Varzin
*3uckei, Vol. VI, P. 81
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and oonstant attempts were made to obtain a statement of
Germany's po!l.icy and attitude in regard to the Near East, but
the "Sphinx" remained "inscrutable." The German press, however
soon began to express an interest in the Eastern Situation.
The Liberal Press became decidedly anti-Russian. Bismarck,
at Varzin, still remained silent. Consequently, on October, 28
the attention of the Powers was centered on the Imperial Speech
at the openinf^ of Parliament in Berlin. The Emperor declared
that the endeavors of the Empire were especially directed to the
maintenance of friendly relations with the neighTbors of Germany
connected by historical ties, and to the preservation of peace
between such neighbors, wherever it might be threatened. From
this, it was easily concluded that Germany's policy was directed
to the maintenance of the agreement between the three Emperors.
Thus, the Emperor gave notice that Germany abided and would
abide by the alliance with Russia.*
On November 4th, the British Cabinet agreed to
invite the Powers to a Conference to be held at Constantinople;
each power to be represented by two Plenipotentiaries # Lord
Salisbury was chosen to represent England, which selection satis
fied even those opposed to Lisraeli and his policies.
Germany, faithful to her oft repeated declaration
that she would accept anything to which Russia and Austria had
given their consent, waited until these two Powers had accepted
the English proposal for a Conference, and then accepted likewis
in her turn.**
*London TimeB, October 21, 1876
**London Times, November 15, 1877

-22-
That the powers entertained little confidence in
the success of the Conference is seen in the fact that Russia
continued to prepare for v/ar, and even Disraeli himself betrayed
doubt, by the warning issued in his Guildhall speech of November 10
"There is no country so interested in the maintenance of peace
as England. ... .however, if she enters into conflict for a
righteous cause, and I will not believe that England will go to
war except for a righteous cause, her resources are, I feel,
inexhaustible . "
*
Lord Salisbury left for Constantinople towards the
end of November. Ee travelled circuitously
,
by v/ay of Paris,
Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, allowing for a day or two at each
capitol in order to interview the sovereigns and their principal
statesmen. His talk with Bismarck showed that Germany still
believed strongly in maintaining absolute neutrality, unless
Austria's position was threatened. He also advocated again
the occupation of Turkey and England to take Egypt as her share.
In addition, he insinuated the occupation of Constantinople by
England. On November 25, Lord Salisbury wired to Lord Derby
of his visit with Bismarck, "The conclusion I drew from my day's
experience was that Bismarck wished for war between Russia and
Turkey because such a war would certainly diminish the fighting
power of Russia, but that he dreaded a war between England and
Russia, because absolute neutrality was a very difficult part
to play—and any bias observed or suspected might cause a grudge
*lIoneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 92
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a^ainst him, either on the part of iiin^land or -^^ussia, on the
great day of the 'revanche', which is constantly in his thoughts."*
The Conference was formally opened just before
Christmas, itussia still maintuined that military occupation
was the only effective guarantee, but the Powers in general
favored the preservation of the status q^uo in Serbia and I.'ontenegro
.
A large measure of administrative autonomy v;as proposed for Bosnia
and Bulgaria, together v/lth guarantees for carrying out the reforms
of the Porte.''-'^
On the very day of the opening oi the Conference,
a Constitution was promulgated by the Sultan containing in v;riting
all the rights and liberties to be desired. This clearly showed
"uhat the Porte considered the Conference and its refornis superfluous.
The terms decided upon by the Powers, which were to be submitted
to the Porte, were whittled down to an irreducible minimum, but
even then were rejected by the bultan and his Council on
January 10, 1377. On January 20. the Conference was brought to
a close. Elliot was recalled on leave and Salisbury came quietly
home. Lord Saliisbury believed xiussia sincere in her desire for
a pacific settlement, and that Bism.arck was responsible for the
failure of the meeting, because of the irreconcilable attitude
he had assumed tov/ard the T^jirks. Gortchakov and the French
minister., Due de Decszes, likev/ise accused Bismarck of being
guilty, believing that had he supported the Russians loyally at
*Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, PP. 96-99
**lv:oneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 107-114
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Constantinople, things would have turned out quite differently.*
In January, after the failure of the conference,
Bismarck proposed an organic alliance v;ith Austria, with the hope
that such Y/ould also meet with approval in iiingland. Russian
threats, he argued, v;ere forcing Germany, against her will^ to
seek alliancei: among all states excepting France and iriussia,
even if these alliances involved sacrifices on C-ermany's part.
Austria, in reply to Germany's advances, merely reassured Germany
that she would remain faithful to the League of the Three Emperors.
At this time Lord Odo Russell reported a conversation with Bismarcii
on January 16, 1677. From this xiussell received the impression
that Bismarck, in order to avoid a Franco -Russian alliance, v^ould
grant Russia "somewhat more than benevolent neutrality '^'^
Another report from Russell, the authenticity of
which is doubtful, states that Bisnarck would like to know what
would be the attitude of iingland if war with France were to
follow. Would she intervene to preserve peace? J'ore directly
Bismarck asked Russell to sound out his government as to the
conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance. Lord
Salisbury wrote to Lady Salisbury, February 11, "Bismarck has
made new proposals for an offensive and defensive alliance,
which have happily not been accepted.** From certain references
some such proposels may have been brought before the Cabinet,
but were rejected. ***
*Langer, S..?. 109
Lerby, Jan. 16, 1877, (unpub) Langer ^. 110
- Cecil, Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, 127
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Such proposals were unv/eloome at this time as there
was a suspicion that the German C: ancellor desired a war betv/een
Russia and Tur..ey in order Lhat he mi^ht be free to deal with
France. *
Russia, in order to strengthen her position, con-
cluded the Treaty of Budapest with Austria, on January 15, 1877.
By this treaty, Austria agreed that if the Constantinople Conference
failed, and a v^ar between Russia and Turkey arose, she would
maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality, and would exert
herself to prevent mediation by the other ?ov/ers. Furthermore,
Austria was to occupy Bosnia and KerzBgovina when she should
choose to do so. Ker military actions, hov«'ever, should not
extend to Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, while
Russia was not to extend her preparations to Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Serbia, and Tontenegro. Other teri-itorial changes which Y.ould
be necessary from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire v/ere to
be regulated by a special convention. This latter was embodied
in a political agreement siriilar to the Reichstadt agreement.*'*'
Lord Beaconsfield did not know that Russia and
Austria had come to an agreement while the Constantinople Con-
ference was still in session in regard to their spheres of
influence in the Balkans, Russia's various diplomatic manoeuvers
at this time betvi/een January, vdien the treaty v/as signed, until
April were mainly for an opportunity to obtain time v^hen the snows
should begin to melt and the season for military action could
*
"''Tor text of January Convention, see Pribram, Vol. II, ' .191-203
''Die Crosse Politik, Vol. II, P. 149-152
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begin. In the meantime, the Saltan likev;ise pretended to carry
out a series of reforms, and one anxiety was removed from Europe
by the signing of a definite peace between Turkey and Serbia.
Russia's first definite step was circulated in a
second Gortchakov Circular, dated January Z-l, 167 7. This
charged that the refusal of the Porte to carry out the demands
of the powers was an insult to the various governments. I^ego-
tiations between Lord jerby and Schouvaloff, Russian ambassador,
resulted in the London Protocal of I 'arch 31, 1877. The protocol
rea^terted the interests of the powers in the amelioration of
the condition of the Christian populations and in the reforms
to be introduced in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. It
also recognized the terms of the peace concluded by the Porte
with Serbia on llarch 1. The ?ov,/ers were to watch the execution
of these prom.ises of the Sultan and if they were disappointed,
the necessary means v/ould be decided upon in order to secure the
welfare of the C-iristian population and the interests of general
peace, i^lngland, however, refused to sanction the Protocol unless
a mutual disarmament took place on the part or -tusLia as well
as Turkey. The Tur.:ish government protested against this super-
vision of the Powers as contrary to the guarantee of Turkish
independence and integrity as contained in the Treaty of Paris.*
On April 24 the Tsar declared war on Turkey, claiming
as his sole ain, the amelioration of the lot of the Christians,
nationalism in the form of Pan-Slavism could not be checked. In
this question, only Bismarck alone revealed sound judgment. His
^Moneypenny & = Buckle-, Vol, VI, p. 1£5, 127, 130, 131
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plan was a compromise based on the partition of Turkey. Ke
v;as anxious to avoid a iiiuropean war which would be likely to
embroil Germany and threaten the unity of the Three Emperors.
The weakness of this union. Bismarck fully realized* which explained
his readiness to approach England for an Anf^-lo -German Alliance.
Liistrust and suspicion of Bismarck were, however, too great. ^11
sorts of sinister designs were attributed to him by the jinglish.
IV Russo-Turkish '.^ar and the Congress of Berlin
England was the only hostile power to i-^ussia in
this v;ar with Turkey. Germany was neutral towards xiussia and
Austrian neutrality had been .-ledged by the January Convention.
England alone answered the xiussian Circular and declared the v/ar
a violation of the Treaty of rtris. o/israeli favored a temporary
occupation of the Dardanelles as a guarantee against a liussian
occupation of Constantinople, but the Cabinet was not prepared
to take such definite action. Instead a threatening note was
issued, warning ilussia ageinst any attempt to blockade the Suez
Canal and occupying Egypt. '
Bismarck had every desire to keep Russia and England
from a war with each other and proposed Syria, Crete, and Gypr'uss
as conpensation for whatever gains -lussia should obtain. A
clash between xiussia and England might easily result in a general
'^Langer, vi . S. P. 125
i
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war. To avoid such he told Russell that, "he would give his
last effort to bring about a cordial and intimate understanding
between England and Russia to which Germany would become a
partner," and asked him to express this policy to Lord Derby,
"of his earnest, sincere, and anxious desire to bring about an
intimate and lasting alliance between England and Germany,"
These efforts on the part of Bismarek failed, however,
as the distrust and suspicion of him and his aims were still too
great. It was still believed that he had designs on obtaining
Holland and plans to destroy France.
The truth of the German position is seen in a
Memorandum dictated by Bismarck, June 18, on the desirable outcome
of the Eastern Question. First, the gravitation of Russia's
and Austria's interests to the east, secondly, Russia to take
a strong defensive position in the East and thus to stand in
need of a German alliance. England and Russia to maintain a
peaceful status quo; the separation of England and France, who
was hostile to France over Egypt, and finally such a relationship
betv.'een Russia and Austria as would make i't difficult for both
to join in carrying on an anti-German conspiracy in the clerical
and centralizing elements of Austria. The importance in this
is, that Bismarck still maintained that peace between Russia and
England should be at the expense of Turkey. "If a war between
England and Russia could not be prevented, an aim, in my opinion
should continue to stand as before, namely, to promote a peace
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which would satisfy both parties at Turkey's expense."*
Disraeli approached Austria to find out if Austria
would co-operate with Sngland in an occupation of the Dardanelles
in case of a continued Russian advance. Andrassy^s reply was
cool, that he was not worried about Russia crossing the Balkans
and had no objection to England's occupation of Gallipoli.
Since nothing could be obtained here further than a "moral
understanding", Count Bismarck was looked to to co-operate in
some way with that step. Bismarck at no time could be critisized
by Russia on the strict observance of his policy of benevolent
neutrality, but his silence and attitude was denounced and
distrusted in England.**
On December 9 Plevna was forced to capitulate and
Turkey lay at the feet of Russia. On December 13, Russia v;as
warned that the occupation of Constantinople wculd oblige England
to take precautionary measures. The term "casus belli" was
preserved for future use. On December 12, the powers were asked
to mediate, but Bismarck flatly refused, as did Austria. This
attitude was disturbing for it v/as greatly feared that Russia's
success would be made a fait accompli, supported by Austria and
Germany ever faithful to the League of the Three Emperors. Russia
would not admit foreign intervention, but sanctioned the deliberation
and decision of the European Powers on clauses of general interest.
*German Diplomatic Documents, E, L, S. Dugdale translation.
Vol. I, p. 55
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 149
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Gortehakov believed, he could rely on Germany and Austria and
thus, with the support of the Lreikaiserbund , make any demon-
strations on the part of England futile. Never had the alli'anoe
of the three Emperors been more complete. Gortehakov told
the French ambassador, "I can assure you that there is not
even the semblance of a rift,"*
The Russian armies continued to advance rapidly to
the Straits and Constantinople. On January 23, 1878 the
Cabinet decided to send the British fleet to the eapitol of
Turkey. This decisive action caused the resignation of Lord
Derby. As soon as the orders to the fleet had been sent,
however, reassuring announcements came from Layard at Con-
stantinople in regard to the peace terms to be offered to
Turkey. The orders to the fleet were therefore countermanded
and Lord Derby returned to office. In the meanwhile, an
armistice was signed on January 21, 1878 between Turkey and
Russia.*'*'
On January 25 Andrassy proposed that the Russian
terms of peace be submitted to a conference of the Powers.
England at first was very suspicious of such a proposal fearing
that her position would be useless against the combined action
of the League of the Three Emperors.***
In spite of the armistice, Russia continued to
advance on Constantinople, England, now thoroughly alarmed, on
February 8, a second time despatched orders for the fleet, which
*Langer, ?. 131
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 227-231
***A. C. Coolidge, P. 130
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was lying at anchor outside the Dardanelles, to advance. Eo
permission had arrived from the Saltan to allow the fleet to
advance, so Admiral Hornby^ in comjiiand of the fleet withdrew
ag-ain to Besika Bay. In order to avoid the ridicule of Europe,
orders for v.ithdrawal could .not a^ain be issued so Hornby Vi/as
instructed to advance without the Sultanas permission. Hu&sia
threatened to march into Constantinople unless Russian troops were
withdrawn.
*
On March 3 the Russians and Turks agreed to the peace
treaty of San Stefano. The salient points were, Fontenegro was
to be enlarged with a port on the iidriatic with complete indepen-
dence; Serbia also - was to be independent with additional territory
to the south-east; Roumanian independence was also agreed upon.
Russia received the right to cede to Roumania I^obrudia, in return
for Bessarabia; Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted reforms sim-
ilar to those proposed at the Constantinople Conference.
The most important part of the treaty was the arrange-
ment for th-^ establishment of a large Bulgaria, autonom.ous, but
tributar^r to the Sultan. ah indemnity was also to be paid to
Turkey. The treaty vi/as not delivered to iiJigland until Larch 23,
three weeks after the signing,'*'*
At the conclusion of this treaty.^ plans were continued
for a Congress to be held at Berlin. Hot until after three long
sessions did the Cabinet decide to accept the Austrian proposal
for a Conference. The question of British participation was even
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. II, ?. 198
^''Die Grosse Politik, Vol. II, P. 210
c
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then conditional and doubtful. There remained the deep-seated
suspicion that the three Empires had come to a preliminary under-
standing and that British interests v;ould be neglected, llo formal
invitation to such a Gonpress was to be issued until preliminary
negotiations were completed, and the "competence" cuestion settled^
namely the right to discuss and decide certain definite points in
the treaty.*
The British position is seen in a statement by
Lord Lerby, I'arch 16, 1878. "Ker Majesty's Government must distinctly
understand, before they can enter into the Congress, that every
article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed
before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order
that it m^ay be considered what articles require acceptance or
concurrence by the several Powers and what do not'.'**
On March 28 Lord Lerby resigned, mainly because of
the calling out of the Reserves in case of'^imminent national
danger or of great emergency.** ouch a move at this time was
unexpected and vms regarded by public opinion as a declaration
of W8r against Russia. Fobilization continued energetically.
Miinster compared the Anglo-Russian situation to tWe kegs of gun-
pov;der. and a number of children (the Turks) and a very mischievous
urchin (I'r. Layard, ambassador at Constantinople) playing with a
box of m.atches close to them.*"'*
*Lie Grosse Politik, Vol. II, ?. 226
Die Grosse Politik, Vol. II, P. 2230
***Lie Grosse Politik, Vol. II, P. 249
i
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Lord Salisbury was chosen to suooeed Lord. Lerby. He assumed
the hufden of the Foreign Office at a very critical time. His
entrance into office was signalized by the publication and
despatch to the Powers of a Circular Note explaining England's
refusal to enter a Congress until Russian reservstions .ere
vjithdravm. This offered a basis for diplomacy. As a challenge
to the Treaty in its entirely, it opened the way for nerotiat ions
.
It also tacitly appealed for the co-operation of other neutral
States. The attitude of the Continent towards English isolation
turned from one of contempt to one of respect.*
Schouvalov, in reply to the Salisbury Circular,
began inq^uiries not only as to what Crreat Britain did not want,
but what she did v^ant. Llegotiations were begun at the initia-
tion of Bismarck, who made it knov.n that he would support a
Congress if England and xiussia could com.e to sore preliminary
understanding beforehand. Bismarck, offered his services as
friendly mediator on the following basis: "The British Fleet
to leave Constantinople and to repass the Dardanelles; the
Russian forces to retire from the Bosphorus to a distance
equivalent to the time required to reinstate the British Fleet
in its present position."''"*
The two Bowers accepted the friendly mediation of
Prince Bismiarck. LIutual distrust, however, protracted by long
discussions, the withdrawal of the fleet and troops. England
also insisted that Russia see that Turkey did not occupy the
*Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, P. £27,230
**i}ie Grosse Politik, Vol. II, P. 262
cc
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neutral zone created by the retirement of the Russians*
Schouvalov did not have much difficulty in discover-
ing from Lord Salisbury what the English did want. From
the Salisbury dispatch it was evident that the British Govern-
ment was opposed to any arrangement which would place Turkey
at the mercy of Russia, and give to Russia the control of
Constantinople, the Straits, the Black Sea, and the route
through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. This meant that
England objected to a big Bulgaria extending from the Black
Sea to the Aegean, and almost to Constantinople, The readiness
of Great Britain for war brought Russia to reason, and forced
her to abandon the idea of a big Bulgaria. Schouvalov, returning
from St. Petersburg after an interview with the Tsar, made
known to Lord Salisbury Russia's decision. A preliminary agree-
ment between England and Russia was signed by these two
ministers in London on May 30, In this memorandum Russia
made alsmot a complete surrender of the idea of a Big Bulgaria,
the outstanding feature of the Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria
was excluded from the Aegean Coast, and the western boundaries
changed to include mainly those of Bulgarian nationality. The
Balkan mountains were to become the boundary of the Turkish
Empire. England was forced to accept Russian retention of
Bessarabia. Russia also stood firm in her hold on Kars and
Batoua.**
^German Documents, Lugdale translation. Vol. I, p. 92
**Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, P. 258
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Fearing, however, that Russia would attempt to
gain compensation in Asia Minor a treaty was now negotiated
with the Porte by En^-land. This provided that if Russia
would retain Batoum, Ardahan, Kara, or any of them, the
British Government would defend by force of arms the Sultanas
Asiatic dominions as drawn up by the Cons-ress, against
any fresh Russian attack. In order to carry out this proposal,
the English were to be allowed to occupy and administer the
island of Cyprus, paying annually to the Sultan the surplus
income over the expenditure in the island. The Sultan in
turn promised to "introduce necessary reforms" for his
Christian subjects in the Asiatic provinces. Cyprus was
probably chosen by Lord Beaoonsfield , as "the key of Western
Asia," and thus the most strategic position.*
V/ith prelim nary negotiations settled, the Congress
was assured. On June 7, the Cabinet decided to enter the
Congress and selected Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury
as Plenipotentiaries, together with Lord Odo Russell, the
English Ambassador at Berlin. England came prepared as no
other country, namely, an agreement with Russia over the main
principles, a convention with Turkey, a moral understanding
with Austria, and on friendly terms with Italy and France.
The policy of Germany was still a mystery.**
*Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, p. E63-273 and
Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, p. 295-298
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, p. 313
t
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Disraeli planned an unhurried trip on account of his ill
health and arrived in Berlin on June 11, a day before other
Plenipotentiaries, which enabled him to have a preliminary
conversation with Bismarck on the eve of his arrival. Lord
Beaconsfield concluded from this meeting that every effort would
be employed by Bismarck to arrange a peaceful settlement.
Another enlightening impression of Bismarck is given us by
Lord Beaconsfield, "He is bound hand and foot to Austria
(Russia), whether he thinks them right or wrong, but always
adds 'I offered myself to England, and Lord Derby would
not notice my application for six weeks and then rejected
it»".*
The first snag encountered in the Congress was
over the important problem of the boundaries of Bulgaria and
thus the northern frontier of Turkey. Bulgaria was to be
divided into two provinces. Lord Beaconsfield insisted on
the Balkan range as the boundary between the two provinces,
with an independent State on the north and the southern to
be under Turkish suzerainty. He threatened to break up the
Congress if Russia refused. Bismarck v;as determined to bring
the Conference to a peaceful close, so sounded out Beaconsfield
privately on the latter 's ultimatum to Russia. The German
Chancellor was convinced that the British Plenipotentiary was
in earnest and informed the Russian Plenipotentiary of this
belief. Russia was forced to yield. Bismarck said to
Lord Beaconsfield, "You have no^/v
*Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, p. 522
e1
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made a present: to the Sultan of the richest province in the
world, four thousand square miles of the richest soil."*
A contemporary letter of Montague Gorry, secretary
to Lord Beaconsfield
,
fives an interesting picture of the
event. "When Lord 3. told .iussia that, unless I'uricey had
the Balkan line with all rights of defending it accorded her,
and unless this new Bulgaria should be so reduced that its
most southern part should he many and many a mile from the
coveted Mediterranean, or in other words go home to prepare
for war with Russia, men were aghast At one
moment it loolced as if Russia could not give in, and I had
made arrangements for a special train for England at a few
hours' notice, when the incic.ent of the Congress occurred.
'At 3:45 on the 21st Bismarck called, and I showed
him, dressed in general's uniform, into my chief's room
—
he (Bismarck; charging me to know when it was 3:55 as he
had an appointment at 4:0C. And so this meetinr between the
two great men lasted about seven minutes. But the business
did not take long. 'Is this really the ultimatum of England?'
said Prince Bismarck. 'Yes, my Prince, it is, ' replied
Lord B. Just one hour after that we learned that the Tsar
agreed to the entire English scheme "**
The next critical questions of interest to England
to be settled v-ere those concerning Batoum and the Russo-
*Money penny (?i Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 325
**Moneypenny & Buckle, Vol. VI, P. 326
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Turlcish boundary In Asia. In nefrotiations with Schouvalov
Lord Salisbury threatened that England vjould demand the
opening of the Straits, if Russia continued to remain obdurate
in her possession of oatoum. Bismarck ag'ain seems to have
intervened and brought pressure to bear on the English
diplomats, who agreed to the proposal that Batoura be made
a free port. Austria was to "occupy and administer" Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Roumania, Serbia, and llontenegro were to
be independent. Russia acquired Bessarabia. In return
Roumania received the territory known as the Dobrudja. Greece
was left to come to an arrangement with Turkey over desired
changes in her frontiers. Before the close of the Congress^
the Gypruss Convention was made public. England alone had
safeguarded her interests.*
On July IS, after a little more than four weeks,
the Congress came to a close. V/hat were the results of it?
Russia, worn out b; v;ar with Turkey, was unable to present
England with a fait accompli. Austria and England demanded
compensation, v;hile Bismarck remained steadfast in his role
of honest broker. Germany wanted nothing for herself except
the presefvation of peace, if necessary at the expense of the
Ottom.an Empire."'*'
The Congress of Berlin was also in a way fatal to
Germany, for it resulted in the collapse of the League; of the
*Cecil, Life of L-rd Salisbury, Vol. II, ?. 294,297
'*'*Ibid, Vol. II, P. 297
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Three Emperors. Russo-German relations were clouded over
and the rift between Austria and Russia was greatly widened,
making Austria all the more dependent on Germany. One
compensation, however, from this change in relationships was
that England's entrance onto the Continental stage made
Germany less dependent on the Dreikaiserbundniss. A new
diplom.atic system was to arise from these changes.*
V Post Congress Europe and the Triple Alliance.
The Congress of Berlin was a great victory for
England and thus a terrible diplomatic defeat for Russia.
The latter 's resentment increased in the period following
the settlement. It was directed mainly towards Germany.
She had e^vpected unrestrained support from her ancient ally
on the questions to be brought up before the Congress. In
the same degree her hostility to Austria became more pronounced.
The League of the Three Emperors was broken; Bismarck had
chosen Austria. Munster continuously stated that Bismarck
was disgusted with Russia, but the English government was
not yet certain of the Chancellor's tactics, or what his future
designs were.** At this time Lord Salisbury stated that
he believed, "All Bismarck is doing looks like clearing the
decks for action."*** Continental Europe seemed to be
*Langer, P. 164-165
**Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol.11, P. 261
***Ibid. Vol. II, P. 362
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forming into hostile cui;:ps. Lord Salisbury "..rote on the
16th of September, 1879, "lituinors are rife of p-rowin/^ coolness
between Russia and G-ermany. Some persons believed to be
well-inforrned think that Russia is organizing' in conjunction
with France and Italy an attack on Gerraany and Austria."''
Early in January of this year, Bismarck had seen
the necessity of an understanding with Austria. "If Germany
and Austria were united, they would be, together a match for
any enemy, France or Russia." Russia was believed to be
m.aking approaches to France, she was steadily increasing her
armaments, and the language of her press was very strong.
^'Therefore, one could not, for the sake of the uncertain
friendship of Russia, antagonize the other Powers, especially
England and Austria. Cn the conirary, a closer understanding
v\/ith the latter must be striven for, and this should be
developed into an organic relationship that could not be
dissolved without the consent of the'parliamentary bodies."
Later- in the year Bismarck expressed this desire still raore
firmly. "I desire, that there should be bet?;een us (Germany
and Austria) not a single coint of disagreement, and to this
I attach so great a value that I am prepared to make real
sacrifices to bring it about The existence and the
integrity of the Austrian Empire are for us the first conditions
of security." **
*Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II ? 361-S65
'^"'Langer, P. 174,175
IT
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News now reached the German Chancellor that
Andrassy had decided to resign. This resignation might
remove any possibility of an Auatro-German alliance. An
agreement with Austria should, therefore, be arranged as
soon as possible while Andrassy, strongly pro-German in
his views, was in power, and this agreement to be based on
the menacing language used by Russia. Furthermore, Bismarck
feared a change in Austria's foreign policy, which might
result in an alliance of Russia, France, and Austria Hungary.
Not such an impossibility as the internal government of
Austria-Kungary seemed to be inaugurating a Slavophil policy.*
Bismarck proposed to interview Andrassy, to which plan the
Emperor objected strongly. At the very beginning of the
negotiations, it was evident that Bismarck would meet with the
opposition of William I, who was on the best of terms with
his nephew, Alexander II. KeverthBless , on August 27 and 28
Bismarck met Andrassy at Gastein, and set forward plans for
a general defensive alliance directed against aggressive
action on the part of any other Power or Powers, and secured
by Constitutional provisions. Andrassy would not accept a
general alliance fearing that it would be intex-preted by
England as a blow against France, although he was apparently
in favor of a defensive alliance against Russia. As a result of
this Conference, Bismarck was assured of Austria's loyalty and
sent a memorandum to the Emperor recommending that an alliance
be arranged. On the other hand, Russia, probably realizing
her isolated condition, had adopted a more conciliatory attitude
toward Germany.
*Pribram, England and Burope, ?. 15-16
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In spite of the objections of the Cabinet, the
German Emperor accepted the invitation from the Tsar to discuss
the present situation. Early in September, they met at
Alexandrovo and easily reached an understanding over the
desirability of maintaining intact the League of the Three
Emperors. This added to the difficulty of obtaining the
Emperor's consent to an alliance with Austria, but he was
finally forced to yield his consent after prolonged persuasions
and threats of resignation.
The alliance between Austria and Germany, as finally
drav;n up, provided that if either of the contracting parties
were attacked by Russia, its ally should come to the assistance
of the other vdth all its forces, and that neither should con-
clude a separate peace. If any other Jov^er should attack
either of the contracting Powers, its ally should at least
observe a benevolent neutrality. In case Russia should come
to the assistance of the attacking Power, each contracting
Power should be obliged to come to the assistance of the
other with all its forces. The treaty was to run for five
years and to be kept secret.*
The most difficult task before Sisraarck now was to
obtain Emperor Williams approval, which was only yielded under
pressure of a threat of resignation on the part of Bismarck
supported by the imperial ministers.
*Pribram, Vol. I, P. 24-33

Englar.d's attitude in regard to these nef?;otiations
between Germany and Austria was constantly kept in the fore-
ground during the discussions period. Andrd^ssy refused to
sign any general treaty of alliance, declaring that Austria
had no quarrel vyith France and vvished to keep on good terms
with her, partly out of consideration for England.*
On October 7, 1879 the Treaty vms finally ratified.
In England the news was well received. Lord Salisbury, too
enthusiastically, hailed it as "good tidings of great joy."*'^
Luring the negotiations for an alliance betv\/een
Germany and Austria -Hungary , Count Ktinster was instructed to
sound out Lord Beaconsfield as to England's policy in case
Germany became involved in a war with Russia because she
refiised to support the latter in her policy in the Eear East.
On account of the different versions of these negotiations, it
is difficult to draw a conclusion of the exact extent of the
proposals. Miinster, in a talk with Lord Beaconsf ield , reviev;ed
the strained relations between Russia and Germany, and the
result of Lord Lerby's refusal of German proposals. In 1676
such approaches were received with coolness and forced Germany
to rely on the League of zhe Three Emperors, a union had now
become impossible on account of Russia's feverish military
preparations. In order to maintain peace, so essential to
German progress, an alliance was proposed between Austria,
Great Britain and Germany. On September 27, Mtinster reported
*Goolidge, A. G. Origins of The Triple Alliance, ?. 171
**Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, ?. S70
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that Lord Beaconsfield "believed a policy of non-intervention
was unpractical as '.,ell as impossible, that Austria and Germany
were the most natural allies. Furtherm.ore , he would enter
with joy into an alliance vjith Germany. England v^fould see that
France never attacked Germany, at the close of the conversation
with IlOnster, Disraeli stated, ".v'rite to the Prince, that if
we. agree together, I consider European peace to be assured for
a lon^c- time to corae; if the Prince will help us in the East,
where the interests of England go hand in hand with those of
Austria, we will undertake to prevent France from^ moving, in
case this policy should involve Germ.any and trouble v;ith Russia.
.Ve will, in that case, keep France quiet. You m;ay depend on us."*
It seem.s quite certain that lltlnster, who was decidedly
Anglophil, outstepped his instructions, for Radowitz of the
German foreign office replied to his report, "Lord Beaconsfield '
s
reply to you does not com.pletely fulfill Prince Bismarck's
expectations .
"
"The question which we put was: What will England
do, if v/e have trouble v. ith Russia owing to our refusal to
support Russian policy in the East rrerely out of consideration
to the friendly powers, England and Austria, and without any
compelling interests of our own?
"If, as Lord Beaconsfield said, England is v;illing
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IV, ^lo . 710. E. T. 3. Dugdale
Translation.
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to limit herself, in the event of a war between ourselves and
Russia, to keeping her eye on France, it is, no doubt, a very
welcome assistance, but yet not sufficient to mai:e the prospect
of a Russian war endurable to us."*
Although l.'iinster had a meeting v;ith Lord Salisbury,
no mention was made of a rapprochement until a fev; days later
at Lord Salisbury's invitation. At this visit Lord Salisbury
announced his pleasure at the relations between iCngland and
Germany, and his desire of a strong bond betvi/een Germany and
Austria, and an alliance between these two Powers.** Mtinster's
reserve tovmrd these proposals left Lord Salisbury with the
impression that Bismarcic had felt a change of mind since the
original overtures, and that the need for English assistance
was now not qy.ite so essential. At any rate, this v;as the last
heard of the proposals made by Count lliinster to Lord Beacons-
field at Eughenden, Septem.ber 27, 1679, leaving the reasons for
the negotiations a mj'-stery . '*''^*
There are many explanations for the abrupt cessation
of the overtures. It is ]aiov;n that Bismarck always felt a keen
distrust of the continuity of British policy because of their
Parlimentary government. There v/as also a disli^^e of Lord
Salisbury on the part of Bism.arck. He would have liked
negotiating directly with .lylsraeli.
*Lie Grosse Politik, Vol. I¥, P. 10, E. T. S. iJugdale
translation
**nQiid. P. 12 Vol. IV
*''*Gecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, P. o72
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Another explanation offered is that Andrassy believed
that Sngland v^/ould object to a fceneral agreement directed
afrainst France and Russia. Bismarck , therefore , hoped to
be able to brin^ England into the alliance, so that he could
disprove Andrassy 's statement. Yi/hen, however, Andrassy
refused to accept a general treaty under any consideration,
the negotiations with Sngland were of no value, and so he
dropped them."^
The raore immediate consideration which determined
Bismarck's policy vyas, without doubt, Russia. Her attitude
after the Congress of Berlin had been very threatening and
aggressive, but with the fear of diplomatic isolation, she
v;as forced to calm her emotions. Russia readily saw that
Germany ¥;ould be the best ally for a checi: on an Austrian-
English advance on Turkey. Saburov now came to Berlin to
prepare the way for an agreement with Gerraany. Russia's
aim was to prevent the occu:^.ation of the Straits by England,
and territorial revisions in Turkey without the previous
consent of Russia. Likewise, the ultimate Gerraan objective
must be to preveno a war with Eraiice for the recovery of
Alsace and Lorraine. Germany's aim would be, to leave
France isolated if she moved to attack Germany. This made
a good foundation for an agreement. Germany could engage
to reriain neutral in an Anglo-Russian conflict and could
*Langer, P. 189
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promise to prevent, if need be by force, any other Po'wer
from joining England, itussia, on the other hand, would
agree to renain neutral in a v.ar between France and Germany^
and would prevent any other Power from ,ioininp France. The
Austro -German alliance had brought Russia to terms.*
The chief problem for itus.sia still centered upon the
question of the Straits. It was a question of Ruscian-English
relations rather than Russian-Austrian. In case of war
between England and Russia, would Turkey, as a neutral Power.,
have the right to allow the passage of the English fleet
into the Black Sea? Bismarck believed that Turkey did not,
but hesitated to make this the basis of an agreement betv/een
Russia and Germany. Bismarck v;as persistent in his faith in
a triple understanding, fifhs; general policy embodied the
following objectives: for Russia, to obtain security in the
Black Sea; for Austria, for the present, to assure herself
of her new position in Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the future,
to assure herself of no changes in the status quo of Turkey
in Europe without her conserit; for Germany to establish on
a perm.anent basis, a European system, insuring her security
and the maintenance of peace; for all three powers, a
guarantee against the danger of coalitions. The three
Powers vi^ere to concert measures to prevent a violation of
the Straits agreement on the part of Turkey. In the second
*Langer, P. 192
€
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place, Russia would recognize the position acquired by
Austria in the i^iear East, and the three Powers would a^ree
that no modifications should be made in the territorial
status quo of Turkey without their consent. Finally, the
contracting Powers v/ould promise each other benevolent
neutrality if one of them became involved in war, and would
see to the localization of the conflict.*
Bismarcic was firralv determined not to make a
separate agreement with Russia, and of triple agreements,
he still preferred one with England and Austria to one with
Russia and Austria. As Russia desired a separate agreement,
so did Austria, whose chief purpose, so Kalnoky, the Austrian
diplomat, declared, was still "the permanent blocking of
Russia." This involved the maintenance of cordial relations
with England. It was again at this time proposed that
England become a partner to the Austro-German alliance,
not only in case of conflict with Russia, but as a check on
Italy, To this, however, Bismarck was opposed.**
The differences of opinion between Germany and
Austria threatened to have a doleful consequence, when
the European situation was suddenly changed by the fall of
the Conservative Ministry in England to the Liberal I.Iinistry
under the control of Gladstone. Gladstone's antipathy to
the Turks was no secret and thus he inclined to co-operate
with Russia for the sake of aiding nationalism
"Simpson, J.Y. Saburov Ivlemoirs, lUneteenth Genturv, Dec. 1917
**Langer, '.V.L. P. 201
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in the Balkans. His distrust and dislike of Austria was
made known in his election address at Edinburgh, March 3 7
In this he declared, "Austria has heen the unflinching foe
of freedom in every country of Europe There is not an
instance there is not a spot upon the whole map where you
can lay your finger and say: 'There Austria did good.*"*
Bismarck, although having a keen dislike of Glad-
stone, made use of this change of policy, to derive all the
advantages possible. The coolness of Anglo-Austrian rela-
tions v\/ould make the Austrian minister, Haymerle, m.ore will-
ing to support an agreement with Russia.**
Lord Granville, the new Foreign Minister, showed
his policy not widely divergent from that of his predecessor.
He wrote to the Queen that he would "impress upon Russia
that while we wished to be on good terms with her, we could
not make any concession, which perhaps they might expect....
The policy of the Government," he continued , "is to press,
in concert with Europe, for the full execution of the con-
ditions of the Treaty of Berlin."*** Gladstone instructed
Lord Odo Russell to coimnunicate to Bismarck the desire for
continued close relations with Bermany, as well as the ap-
proval of the new English Governm.ent, of the alliance between
Germany and Austria.****
*Morley, Life of Gladstone, quoted by Langer, P. 201
**Simpson, J. Y. ?. 128
^***Pitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. 209-211
^''*3uckle. Letters of Queen Victoria, Vol. Ill, ?. 90-93
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During the summer of 1880 attention was focused on
the Near East. England attempted to win the support of the
powers in a plan to force Turkey to grant territorial con-
cessions to Montenegro and Greece, as decided upon in the
Treaty of Berlin. The Greeks demanded Epirus and Thessaly,
which Turkey refused to surrender. All attempts of the Powers
to mediate had failed and a war between Turks and Greeks
threatened not only the East, hut also the general peace of
Europe.
Granville suggested that a conference be held at
Berlin to settle the dispute; and to this the Porte agreed.
Turkey refused to accept the recommendations of this Con-
ference, that Dulcigno be ceded to Montenegro. The Albanians
were encouraged to revolt by the Porte and England proposed
a naval demonstration in support of ITontenegro . This threat
failed since only Russia and England were ready to take
coercive measures. The danger of a possible Anglo -Russian
-
Italian combination over the Montenegrin question alarmed
Bismarck so that he exerted all his influence to force the
Porte to yield. With the danger of the alternative occupa-
tion of the prosperous town of Smyrna, Albanian troops were
ejected from Dulcigno and Montenegro entered into possession
on November 27.*
As this Dulcigno demonstration clarified British
policy under Gladstone, so did it clarify Bismarck's attitude.
*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill,
P. 151-153
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This active move in support of Montenegro and Greece mi^ht
result in a war with Turkey and finally in the collapse
and partition of the Ottoman Empire. Such action would be
contrary to the interests of Austria, and indirectly contrary
to Germany *s wishes. Bismarck proposed to Lord Odo Russell
his solution of the Turkish Question, namely, a peaceful
division of influence in the Balkans between Austria and
Russia. Austria to have the greater influence in the western
half as far as the Aegean, while Russia should have a free
hand in the Eastern half, as far as the Straits. Germany
v/ould act as mediator between the two. "England's interests
are in Egypt and Asia, as those of Prance are in Syria and
Tunis."*
Bismarck dreaded somewhat the disruption of the
Ottoman Empire, in the fear that the maintenance of peace
between Russia and Austria would be difficult, if possible.
He told Lord Odo Russell that, "he wished to remain, as in
the past, the friend of Russia; thct his alliance with
Austria offered no hindrance to this, and that he intended,
if the ease arose, to support very fully the interests that
Russia possesses in the Eastern Question."**
Bismarck did not see any reason why friendly rela-
tions should not exist between Russia, Austria, and Germany. H
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, ?. 2E5, Lord Odo Russell to Lord
Granville, Jan. £6, 1881
**Simpson, J. Y. Pp. 167-70, quoted by Langer, P.
€
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stated, "1 flatter myself on having been the first in
Europe to break with that old tradition with which the
Vifestern Powers have inoculated all the Cabinet, narnely, that
Constantinople in the hands of Russia would be a European
danger. I consider that a false idea, and I do not see
why an English interest must become a European interest."*
A meeting of the ambassadors at Constantinople
finally agreed on the cessions to be made to Greece in
Thessaly and Epirus. The Greeks objected strongly as it
was a much smaller grant than that designated in the Congress
of Berlin, or in the Berlin Conference of 1880, but were
forced to yield. Bismarck co-operated with Gladstone to
accomplish this settlement. The reasons for this were,
without doubt, to help preserve peace, to prevent EnvO-land
from combining with Russia, and to prevent an overthrow of
the Liberal Government. A Conservative Government would be
liable to encourage Haymerle in his objections to an
agreement with Russia. Bismarck was provoked at Haymerle 's
dilatory action and warned Austria of the danger of refusing.
As a result of this, the Austrian Minister yielded to
Bism.arck's advice. The assassination of Alexander II on
March 15, 1881, made the outcome of negotiations doubtful,
but Alexander III almost immediately expressed his approval.
The treaty was finally signed at Berlin on June 18, 1881,
and was to remain in force for three years.**
*Simpson, J. Y., Nineteenth Centruy, Jan. 1918, P. 68
**Sim.pson, J. Y. Appendix II, Pp. 296-299; Die Grosse Politik,
Vol. Ill, Ko. 232. Fr. trans. Vol. Ill, No. 532
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In 1880 Bisraarolc learned of Russian advances to
Paris and Rome. The latter accepted these approaches seriously
until warned by England. This attitude increased Bismarck *s
dislike of Italy and increased his friendship for France.
This friendship was displayed in the Chancellor *s benevolent
support of France in Tunis. Italy had likewise a very deep
interest in Tunis, as it served, on account of its proximity,
as an outlet for Italian overpopulation. Because of the
Franco-Italian rivalries in Tunis, the Italian Government
offered to sanction an alliance with Germany and Austria, in
return for support in her Tunis program and the cession of
the Trentino by Austria. Such proposals were, however, received
with coolness by Bismarck.*
In January 1881, King Humbert of Italy received a
visit from the brother of the Bey of Tunis. The political
significance of this demonstration was emphasized. The
French Government now believed it time for strong action.
Taking advantage of a frontier raid, the invasion of Tunis
was begun. On May 1£ the Treaty of Bardo was signed, which
amounted to the establishment of a protectorate by France.
This occupation of Tunis was accomplished with the aid of
Bismarck. Lord Granville wished to send a despatch to
Austria and Germany in an attempt to bring about concerted
action against France, but was dissuaded from such a move
Goolidge, A. C, P. 201-208
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by Gladstone. The Siiltan also v;as ready to support Italy,
encouraged by the attitude of the Enxrlish, but threats from
Paris and Berlin prevented him. 3isi:;arck's support of France
and her policy aimed, without doubt, to help France obtain
compensation for her losses of 1870 and 1871, and in order
to attract the attention of the Powers to territory where
there were no 0-erman interests at staJce.'^
The important factor of French action in Tunis is
that it emphasized Italian iLolation in the diplomatic world.
I'oreover, it increased the importance of comin.--: to an a..gree-
ment with Germany and Austria. Bismarck, however, was not
yet ready for such proposals, as the advantaf'e of such were
slig-ht, and the Italian Govern: lent was in a period of rreat
instability.
On November 14, IdSl Gambetta came into oower in
France. The fact that he was known to favor an active
foreign policy increased the feeling of hostility in Italy
for France. Gambetta declared, in his electiori address, his
faith in "immanent justice" to right the vrong of 1871. Lord
Lyons was of the opinion that, "certainly Gambetta v;ould not
find the nation in heart to follov/ him in defying Germany ."'^*'
Bismarck accepted the new ministry in this manner, namely,
that the French people wer-e not yet ready or willing to enter
upon any aggressive policy. Gambetta already envisaged
*Lie Grosee Politik, Vol. Ill, Chao. 20 also Vol. IV, No. 723
**Langer, u . L. P. 228-238
''f**Lord Hewton, Lord Lyons, Vol. II, P. 264
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the so-called Triple Entente, which was to bring disaster
to Germany in 1918. V/ith this aim in view, he negotiated
a commercial treaty with England and strove for successful
co-operation in Egypt. This hostile feeling of France under
Gambetta and the open anti-German agitation of the Pan-Slavs
in Russia made Bismarolc more eager for an agreement with Italy,
and negotiations were opened. Italy's desires v/ere, some
guarantee of Rome, support in her Mediterranean policy and
an opening left for the admission of England to the arrange-
ment. Bismarck and Kalnoky, the Austrian minister, realized
that Italy and England had a common interest in checking
France in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, her coastline
was exposed to a naval attack. Keverthreless
,
they were only
willing to insert a declaration that the agreement was not
directed against England. The chief advantage to Bismarck
of an alliance with Italy was the assurance of having a
friendly power on Austria's frontier, who would not divert
Austrian troops to the Austro-Italian border. On this basis
the treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed on ITay 20, 1882.
Italy would not join a hostile combination, and would not
attack Austria in the rear in the case of war with Russia.
In return Italy was promised support in case of a French
attack. *
Pribram, Vol. I, ?. 65-74 also Die Grosse Politik, Vol. 11^,
Chan. 15. Text, Vol. Ill, No. 571 (Fr. translation, Vol. Ill
No. 610 *
t
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VII Egypt
In 1875 Lisraeli had purchased shares of Suez
Canal Litook. This made England the chief single stock-
holder and ^ave her a voice in the councils of the Company.
The Khedive was forced to sell the shares to :,.>ay the interest
on a hu^e debt incurred as a victim of adventurous money-
sharpers, vjho loaned monej^ at an exceedingly hif'h rate of
interest. Lisraeli realized the political importance of
this move as well as the strategical. With such an interest
in the Suez Canal, i^ngland was n turally interes:;ed in the
country through which it flowed and the conditions of that
country. French influence in Egypt T^as also a factor to
be considered. From the time of Ivapoleon, France v;as not
indifferent to Egyptian affairs. The construction or the
Suez Canal had also been undertaken Xj^r the French engineer,
De LessepG, a close frien.. of Fohanmed Ali's son and successor,
Mohajnmed Said."*'
Imjr.ediately after the purchase a !.;r. Stephen Cave
vvas sent to investifra$!e the financial conditions of the
country. The report of I'.r. Cave revealed the financial
condition of Egypt as not desperate, that E/^-ypt could "bear
her debt at a reasonable rate of interest. Hardly was this
report m.ade known v;hen the Khedive suspended payment of
*Langer, P. 256-258
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treasury bills. On I'ay 2 a Gaisse de la Lette was ectablished
and on llovember 18, 1877, European control v/as created, which,
it was hoped, would restore the financial situation. By
this arrangement^ Vr. mivers ./ilson v;atched over the receipts
of the State revenues and I,-. Le lilirnieres, French controller,
supervised, checy.ed, and audited the accounts and payments
of the Treasury. The Jiinglish controller was a member of the
ConiiTiission of tue i-^ublic Lebt, and was to be apoointed only
vdth approval, unofficially obtained, of the British Government.
In j:iUgust 1878, the lual Control was abolished'
together with the European llinistry^ in whici; I'r. liivers
V/ilson snd l\ 31ignieres had attempted to straighten out the
tangled conditions. In February lo79 Ilubar Pasha, the Prime
-
I'inister^ was dismissed, although supported by tv.o pov;erful
foreign Governments, France and England . At tLls time
Greet Britain took her first definite step of interference
in the internal affairs and government of Egypt. It was
seen that it would be best not to insist on the reelection
of Kubar, but new arrangenient s were agreed upon. The English
and French members of the Cabinet were to have a right of
veto over any proposed measure. The Khedive, Ishmail Pasha,
accepted these conditions, but managed to avoid their ful-
fillment by dismissing in Aprils xiivers V/ilLon and Blignieres,
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. £49
**Cromer, Vol. I, P. 81-2
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in order to i'orrn a purely Kfyptian Cabinet.'^
Ibrnail then canie forward with a financial plan of
his own, which involved the reduction of the interest on
the unified debt from seven to six per cent, the payment in
cash of fifty-five per cent of the floatin^c- debt (the
remainder to be paid in two and one-half years), and the
asLignrnent of four million pounds annually to administrative
purposes . **
Before England and France could express their
opposition to the Isnail's plan, Germany surprised the world
by protesting a^&inst this new financial scheme of the Khedive.
England and France followed suit on June 6. Germany's
interests in Egypt at this time were of little value, so that
this was not an afiroii behalf of German investors. v»hile the
German Chancellor m.ay have desix-ed to iceep a certain amount
of rivalry between England and France, or England and Russia,
he did not desire such feeling to lead to a war.
In the spring of 1679 Anglo-French relations were
not very peaceful. England was not willing to sanction such
active support to the ooiidholders in Egypt as x-rance.
Bism.arci^'s intervention at this tim^e was for the purpose
of encouraging England and in anticipation of a split between
France and England which would bring France closer to Hussia.
*Qromer, Vol. I, ?. 90
*'^Langer, ?. 261
***Lie Grosse ?oliti]i. Vol. II P. 29^i, also Vol. Ill, P.661
€«
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This impression is received from the assurances which the
German rovern; ent gave to both the ^n^lish and the French
governments, that she intended in no way to infringe on the
political field v/here the Anglo-French entente functioned.*
In June 1879 Ismail v^as forced to abdicate and was
succeeced by his son. In Septe-iiber the controllers were
reestablished, v;ith the new provision that they should not
be removed again without the consent of i^ns'land and France.
This revealed that J^ngland was now to five active support
in securing the interests of the bondholders, much to the
misgiving of Lord Salisbury.*'^
An international commission was now established v;ith
France and England doubly represented, to reorganize finances.
\!ltb. a total debt of about ninety-eight million pounds,
financial stability could be obtained or maintained only by
rigid economy. Guts were made in the salaries of lower
officials, who later becarie the leaders of the opposition.
This discontent and distijii'bance
,
however, was ef a national
character as ell as military^ although in a rudimentary
state. The arm^y becam.e more and :nore mutinous, which
resulted in a demonstration before the palace oi the IChedive,
and the following demands* the dismissal of the ministers,
the convocation of the Chamber, and the increase of the army
to eighteen thousand men. The Khedive was at the mercy of
the army.***
*Langer, P. 261
**C6cil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. II, P.255-S99
***Cromer, Lord, Vol. I, P. 186
c
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The Liberal Gladstone Ministry had no specific policy
in regard to the Egyptian crisis. Conseq.uently
,
they were
v.illing to support Turkish troops in an effort to restore
order. France was opposed to this plan because of the
effect such a move might have on Tunis and Algeria. Gambetta^s
accession to pov.er at this time, November 1887, put an end
to uncertainty and advocated intervention on behalf of the
Khedive. England was convinced by Gambetta of the need for
intervention and supported the French statesman in a note to
the Khedive. In this despatch France and Great Britain
declared for the maintenance of the Khedive on the throne
as the only guarantee for good order and prosperity. The
two Governments also resolved to guard against any menance,
external or internal of the order of things in Egypt.*
The Gambetta Note once again aroused the European
Powers. Hitherto Bismarck had supported the Egyptian policy
of England and France, as an essential factor in preventing
an understanding between France and Russia. In June, 1881,
the tripartite agreement relieved Russo-Gerraan tension, and
accordingly Bismarck's interest in the Anglo-French entante
lessened. The Gambetta Note seemed to reveal a predominance
of French prestige in Egypt, which would not be to GBrmany's
interest. Although the little sympathy he had for the
weaknesses of the Gladstone Ministry was apparent, he
*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. Ill,
P. 167-168
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decided to pave the way for an English retreat from
support of the French policy. Conferences were held between
representatives of Germany, Russia, Austria, and Italy,
in which it was decided to uphold the maintenance of the
status quo in Egypt. Identical notes were sent to the
Sultan on this basis, the maintenance of the status quo,
to be modified only with the previous consent of the great
Powers. Bismarck feared that Egypt might become the
Schleswig Holstein of the Western Powers. He advised Lord
Granville to appeal to the Sultan to restore order.
France was strongly opposed to such a plan, so Granville
internationalized the situation by consulting the Powers,
The atmosphere was cleared, however by the fall of
Gambetta, and the succession of Freycinet, who was more
amenable to the English plan of Turkish intervention
in Egypt.*
The action of England and France in Egypt had
been a cowardly one. Bismarck felt that England could
no longer be considered an important factor in European
politics because of her vacillating policy.
Morley, Life of Gladstone, 1902 edition. Vol. Ill, P. 75-78

'I'd"
It was felt that the Egyptian T'inistry was too
much under the control of the controllers, so that a new
Ivlinistry was chosen which v/as extremely nationalistic.
For political revenp-e many of the officers were exiled on
the charge that they had plotted to assassinate Arabi,
Minister of V/ar. Tew^ilt brouf:ht about European intervention
when he appealed to the ?ov;ers to lessen the sentence
imposed. England and France proposed to send a joint
Anglo-French fleet to Alexandria, and to be ready to invite
the Sultan to despatch an amed force thither as the mandatory
of Europe, but always under Anglo-French control and for a
special purpose, l^his proposal proved a failure as Prince
Bismarck now refused to support the proposal of intervention
by the Sultan with a European llandate. France also remained
silent on the conditions upon which she would consent to
the appearance of a Turkish force in Egypt, or even a Turkish
Commissioner.''' Freyeinet at last suggested that a Conference
should meet at once to regulai-e the conditions on which
coercion should be applied by the x^orte in Egypt. The Sultan
dislilced this iiuropean supervision and so delayed the
Conference until June 23. In the meantime a Turkish mission
v/as sent to strengthen in every possible way Turkish authority
in Egypt. V/ith the excuse that he must first obtain the
results of this investigation, the Sultan -£ fused to take
part in the Constantinople Conference.*'*'
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. 262-S
Xanger, ?. 272
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In the meantinie, events were movinr quickly in
Alexandria. Public opinion against foreign intervention
grev./ more excited. On June I'd anti-l'oreipTi rebellions broke
out in Alexandria; Alexandria became a prey to riot and
pillage, and fifty Europeans were massacred. Arab's I'inister
of V/ar, was now practically dictator. Preparations Y«'epe
begun early in June for the defense of Alexandria against
action from Vvithout. On July S Admiral Seymour of the British
fleet was ordered to prevent the erection of fortifications
and if necessary to destroy the earthworks.
The French government v;as invited to co-operate, but
refused to do so. On July 11, the fortifications were bom-
barded by the British fleeL. A fire followed the bombardment
a{id much damage v/as done to European property/. A condition
of anarchy now existed, spreading to other provinces, which
gave Great Britain the desired justification (^for armed inter-
vention . *
"The history of txhe next tv^/o inonths may be summarized
in a single sentence; England stepped in, and with one rapid
and well-delivered blow, crushed the rebellion," wrote Lord
Cromer.**
Simultaneously with military preparations, diplomatic
negotiations were actively carried on. The French Government
*Fitzmaurice , Vol. II, P. 26;3-E&4
**Croraer, Vol. I, P. 300
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decided to separate the question of protectinp- the Suez
Canal from that of intervention. They refused to talce part
in military operatiorjs in the interior of c^gypt except
in the case of direct acts of a^£^resf3ion, M. de Freycinet had
no o'ojection, however, to common action with Englani in
defense of the Suez Canal, Although raany in France denounced
tht hesitancy of 11. de Freycinet, T. Glemenceau congratulated
the Government on not having taken part in the bonibardment
of the forts at Alexandria. Ke also approved of the Conference.
He was very suspicious of G-erraany's policy and intentions.
He states, "it appeared to hirri. that endeavors were beinp-
made to get the French forces scattered over Africa, and that,
as Austria had been pushed into Bosnia and lierzegovina , so
France had been pushed into Tunis and Y;as now being pushed
into Egypt."*
France was haunted by the fea)r that she wauld
be left isolated in Europe. 1'. de Freycinet desired to have
a European mandate establishing France and England as
guardians of the Canal. Such a plan was proposed at the Con-
ference at Constantinople. This Conference should designate
the Powerf:: wl ich ' ere to taice the action necessary for the
protection of the canal, in case Turkey failed to provide
any effective measure. Prince Bisrrarck objected to this
proposal on the ground that it might give the question
"greater proportions by such a step, and by converting it
into a war betv.een the Christian jPo'vers of Europe and the
llohammedan countries."** Count lliinster, however, assured
*Cromer, Vol. I, P.30;5
**Gromer, Vol. I, ?. 304
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Loi-d Granville that in the event of the British O-overnment
taking action on their own initiative, they v/oulci rerjeive the
moral support of Germanjr, although Prince Bismarck vvas not
prepared to go to the len^^th of a formal mandate.
Whether the security of the Suez Canal vvas threatened
or not is a debatable question. At any rate, England believed
the danger real. The French G-overninent under Freycinet
favored active intervention in Egypt for the protection of the
Canal, but was defeated 4n this issue July 19, 1882. The
Italian Government likewise, almost simultaneously signified
their refusal to .loin the ujnd ertaking .
*
The patience of the British Government v.as worn to
a frazzle. On Jul^^
,
it wa.s decided to instruct that Lord
Lufferin should inform the Porte that in face of the growing
seriousness of the situation, which no longer brooked delay,
G-reat Britain considered herself invested v/ith the duty of
restoring order in Egypt, and of maintaining the safety of
the Suez Canal. On August 7, Lord G-ranville addresLied a
circular despatch to the Powers stating that, with the approval
the Khedive, Great Britain v/ould take all necessary measures
to safep-uard the Canal. The Sultan "as also informed that the
Turkish arm.y would not be allowed to land until the Sultan
had stated what his real intentions were, and had previously
proclaimiCd Apabi a rebel. On the 14th the Conference broke
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. 2G9-E70
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up after adopting a recolution in ref^ard to the necessity of
an international agreement on the position of tlie Canal.
On the 19th of August, Sir Garnet V/olseley of the War Office
landed at Port Said. On Septemloer 10 the battle of Tel-el-ilebir
was fought
.
"Allov. me to congratulate you most sincerely and
heartily (Lord Ampthill v;rote fror: Berlin) on the great
success you have already achieved. You have got the Great
Powers v;ell in hand, and Bismarc^c's full sympathy for the
vigorous policy you have adopted, which he appreciates and
respects, and v;ill support should differences arise in the
future In regard to Eastern affairs, Bisraarclc
has never concealed his anxious desire to see Austria occupy
Bosnia, France occupy Tunis, and England occupy Egypt, and noYi
that those wishes have been realized, his next wish is that the
ever-recurring danger to Europe of another Oriental crisis
and all its conseq_uences^ In his opinion a gradual dismem-
berment of the Turkish Empire is the only pacific solution to
the Eastern Q,uestion."*
iVith the British victory at Tel-el-lCebi^ the nation-
alist and revolutionary moven^.ent under Arabi collapsed. The
British were in occupation of Egypt. Oount -i^erbert Bismarck,
*Lord Araphill zo Lord G-ranville, September 9, ;.0, 1882,
quoted by Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. 271
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then on a visit to London, confirmed Lord Ampthill's conviction
that his father would give ^rreat i3_-itain his full diplomatic
support, and that he would regret an interruption of our
friendly relations ..ith France.'^
"The contrary (the Ambassador at Berlin wrote) is
generally believed, even by serious statesmen v;ho might l:noi*v
bette'r, if they would but consider that the key to Bismarck's
policy is to be sougiit in the true interests of Germany, and
that those interests require the maintenance of the Anglo-French
alliance, and of intimate relations between ilngland and Germany."^
Prince Bismarck in a letter to Lord Ampthill at
this time explained his viev;s in regard to the relations of
Germany and Great Britain. A copy of this letter was
communicated to Lord Granville
.
Letter of Prince Bismarck:
"I learn v;ith pleasure that the policy which v/e
have followed since the commencement of English intervention
is beginning to be ap reciated also in the political circles
of Enp-land.
"In the absence of any direct German interests in
the future settlement of Egyptian affairs, and with the
certainly that France and the probability that Russia would.
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. 271
**Lord Am.pthill to iiord G^ranville, January 20, 18S'6
***Lord Am.pthill to Lord Granville, September 12, 1882.
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under given circumstances become our opponents, I have advo-
cated with the Emperor the necessity of avoidin^--independently
of the occasionally astounding policy of succeedinf- English
Cabinets--every conflict with the British nation and public
opinion in England which could influence the national feeling
of England against us, so long as e are not forced into it
by^aramount G-erman interest.
"Assuming that the ambition of an English Adnin-
istration in regard to Egypt were to overstep the limits
v.hich, in my opinion, a reasonaole British policy ought to
respect
,
we should not feel called upon to quarrel v.dth
England, even out of friendship for the other Powers.
"We can only give positive support to English
wishes within very narrow limits, unless we are prepared to
take up a more hostile position than necessary tov.?ards
Russia, and to call forth not only in France, but in a great
majority of the people of England^ -^he unfounded suspicion
that our policy tends to disunite the two great Western
Powert; and to 'manoeuvre' them into war \.ith each other,
which both fear and dread the cost of.
"I have encountered no difficulties in ny endeavors
with the Emperor to render our policy friendly to England,,
but I have had to overcom.e opposition and contradiction at
every single succeeding step at Vienna, partly from Tir.
Gladstone's former unfounded menaces against Austria, partly
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from Austrian Turcophilism , not only political, but
also speculative and financial, in regard to contemplated
railway enterprises, and partly also from the v/ant of
habit at Vienna to consider the future of political questions
beyond the current vi/eek.
"I am not yet thoroughly v/ell-inforned in regard
to the causes of the violent antagonism of a great part of
our German press against li^ngland. V/hen it is not merely the
ir.nate German tendency always to 'find fault* and to 'Icnov/
better' , I an inclined to think that it is partly due to the
financial sorroivS of great financiers connected v,ith the large
newspapers, and partly to the large sums of money e:<=Lpended
by the French, and the still larger- sums of money expended
by the Russians to bribe the Germian press.
"The greatest difficulty, hov;ever, we encouiiter,
iij tr;^ing to rive a practical expression to our sympathies
for and our relations with England, is in the absolute
impossibility of confidential intercourse in consequence of
the indescretion of English statesm.en in their communications
to Parliament, and in the absence of security in alliance for
"Vvhich the Grovm is not ansv/erable in England, but only the
fleeting Cabinets of the day. It is, therefore, difficult
to initiate a reliable understanding v;ith En.Q-land other\7ise
than publicly and in the race of all Europe. Such phbiie
negotiations from, their initiation, and even ^althout
arriving at any definite result, would be highly detrimental
mt
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to most of our Siuropean reiatioriS, but all thet:e difficulties
shoulc;, not be allov;ed. to stand in the way of our cordially
ent ertaininf any advcnces made to us, or to orevert us [Tom
cultivating the consolidation oi our and Austria's friendship
•;^/i th iingland . "
The primary object of the German Chancellor's
intervention in 1879 had been to prevent a split in the
Ans:lo-French Entente which mip-ht have led to a drifting together
of France and Russia. It was due to Bismarck's attitude
that the action of G-reat Britain, in the occupation of
^F,yP'^> ^0"^ create certain grave complications. In 1682
the League of the Three Emperors had been concluded and
Germany no longer feared an approach between France and
Russia. The anxiety nov,' vvas that the ?/eak Gladstone I'inistry
would lose its preponderance in Zg^rgt,. To avoid sucii, Bismarck
gave England his moral support, vet without estranging the
French. V'hen at the bombarding of Alexandria, it v/as evident
that France would not act, the Chancellor had also given
England his v;hole-heartea support. This helps to explain the
reason why England was able to carry through the occupation
of Egypt. "The benevolent attitude of the French, '.vas, of
course, of great importance, but it vvas equally important
that the other powers should maintain an attitude of attention.
Bismarck may be truly said to have kept the ring for the
English anci to have made the occupation of Egypt possible."*
*Langer, P. 277
II
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On January Z, 1883, a circular despatch was issued
to the Powers from the British Foreign Office. This Note
pointed cut that unforseen events had placed upon ibn^frland the
suppression of the movement of iirabi Pasha. This duty had
been performed , and although it was unavoidable that a
British force should for some tine lonf^er remain in Egypt,
the G-overnment were desirous of withdrawing it v/henever their
task in Egjrpt was accomplished. This tas.i included free
navigating of the Suez Canal, neutral in time iSf way, and
open equally to the cormnerce of all the nati-ns of the world
in tim.e of peace. There was also m.entioned the formation
of an efficient Egy^.tian army under foreign officers, and
the substitution of a gendarme for the native police. Last
but not least, the appointr.ent of a European Financial
Adviaen in place of the Lual Control was announced as necessary
on account of the changed circumstances.*
This concluding statement put an end to Lual
Control. The British Controller immediately resigned and the
Khedive abolisheo the office. France was invited to nominate
a candidate for the office of Financial Adviser, but instead
protested that the Dual Control could only be abolished
with the consent of the Powers concerned. Thereupon, Sir
Auclcland CoMn was appointed Financial Adviser to be
succeeded soon after by V.r . Edgar Vincent.'^*
*Fitzmaurice , Vol. II, P. ;:;07-S08
**Ibid, Vol. II, P. 388
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The abolition of the liual Control was approved b;/
Prince Bismarolc, "partly because it terminated the dangers
of a condominium, partly because it was an act of vigor." *
France at tnis time sought nevv adventure;, in China arousing
still more the anxieties of England, which any disturbance
in China invariably caused. A number of outrages against
England were coinmitted by the Frerich Commander, Pierre, in
Madagascar. This was only one instance of the aggressive
conduct of French agents in every corner of the world.
Because of these conditions, good relations with Germany were
more of a necessity than ever. nunber of demonstrations
in France against G-ermany showed on what a slender thread
the peace of Europe was suspended. Therefore the colonial
activities of France under 1 . Ferry v;ere welcomed by Bismarck
in the hope that they would divert attention and energies of
France abroad; but he did not intend that they should hinder
British policy in iilgypt . ''"'^
Early in 1883 the Prince of .,'ales visited Berlin.
At this time Prince Bismarcic expressed the hope that Her
Majesty's G-overnment would not 'v.ithdraw the troops from
Egypt before safety and stability could be guaranteed by
England to Europe.*'*"*
Events occurred, however, showing the absolute
impossibility of an early evacuation of Egypt. A religious
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. ;i08
**Fitzmaurice, Vol. P. ol7
**''Lord Ampthill to Lord Granville, i.'.arch 8,7, 1883, quoted
by Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. 517
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fanatie, Mohammed Ahmed, had proclaimed himself Mahdi in the
Sudan and soon brought most of the country under his control.
Egyptian expeditions were sent out against him, with the
crowning disaster in November, 1882, when General Hicks and
the Egyptian troops of which he was in command, v?ere annihil-
ated. It was decided now to abandon the Sudan; in January
1884 G-eneral "Chinese" G-ordon was sent to evacuate the garris
of Khartoum and other fortresses of the Sudan. Gordon, too,
was surrounded and beseiged by the enemy. Although a
relief expedition was despatched under Vvolseley, it arrived
too late. The town had fallen to the Mahdi and Gordon also
met his death in the disaster. Evacuation of the Sudan was
now postponed. This likewise added to the growing Anglo-
French hostility.*
From 1882 the conclusion of the Anglo-French
Entente may be dated; a fact of great importance to the
international relations of Europe. France and England were
allied together with a certain community of interest as a
counter-weight to the Alliance of the Three Emperors.
The western grouping was now dissolved only to be followed
by twenty years of antagonism in the place of the former
cordiality. This strengthened the position of the eastern
European combination inasmuch as it weakened the position
of France and England. Bismarck made full use of this
rupture between France and England. It is said that his
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, ?. 319-520
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personal ability was reinforced by luck; his opponents
always made exactly the mistakes which were necessary for
his game. *
VIII The Era of Colonization
As relations with France ^rew more and more
tense, friendship with Germany became more and more essential.
British statesmen, however, showed themselves ^ust as
tactless in the cultivation of this friendship as in the
handling of the Egyptian question. They did not realize
that the policy of Bismarck was not based on sentiment
alone. Although Bismarck had stated that his interests
demanded the maintenance of the Anglo-French alliance, not
long before the Chancellor had remarked to Hohenlohe that
Cxcrmany could stand by quietly "if the English and French
locomotives collided somewhere."**
From this statement it is evident that Bismarck
did not go out of the way to create friction between France
and England, but believed that one would act as a check
upon the other. In case these Powers were to collide,
German interests would not demand intervention to end the
hostilities. Furthermore, the outbreak of hostilities
would drive England further into dependence on Germany, and
France would be completely isolated.***
*Schweinitz, Den\\Tirdigkeiten, Vol. II, P. 212, September
4 1882, quoted by Langer, P. 282
**Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, P. 273
***Bismarck, Gesammelte w'erke. Vol. VIII, P. 446, quoted
by Langer, P. 283
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Bismarck had helc! the balance of power in Egyptian
questions and had loyally supported, iiing-land. Ke v;a£
prepared to do so in the future, provided that he received
a "quid pro quo." In return for moral support in the
Egyptian question Bisrnarclc believed it only fair that England
should support German interests, which did not seriously
affect Great 3ritain. In short, "he expected the Enr-lish
Governraent to look benevolently on the German efforts to
acquire colonial possessions and to establish an overseas
empire . ""^
Soon after the formation of the German Empire a
considerable party had arisen favoring a colonial policy.
3y 1680 it had gained quite an influence over public opinion.
Certiiin economic forces had brought about a huge emigration
from Germany, and produc^-d great social unrest. These
factors were important in turning the 6hancellor from a
free trade policy to one of protection and decided his
co-operation with the colonial cause. In addition the
pressure of modern econondc developVf»&»^' had m^ade necessary
new markets and new sources of raw riaterial more essestial
to Germany than to any other country. German industry and
Qommerce grev/ by leaps and bounds. Merchants and traders
began to ap ear on the coasts of Africa and in the i-acific.
I!issionaries combined trading activities v/ith their spiritual
duties. Thus by 1680 there were about fifteen German firms
*Langer, W. L. P. 283
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and sixty factories on the west coast of Africa, while the
missionaries had some hundreds of stations. In the Pacific
the German firm of Goddefroy enjoyed a practical monopoly
of the Samoan trade, and German interests were exceedingly
large in the Fiji and other islands.*
Bismarck had been in sjimpathy with the colonial
movement since 1876; and became more and more its advocate
after the reversal of his economic policy from free trade
to protection, '^he dominating aim of Bismarck throughout,
however, was to establish German hegemony in Europe. Instead
of colonization clashing with this aim, as many believed,
it became essentially a part of this program. After founding
the Empire, the Chancellor came to believe that in order
to secure and maintain a position of supremacy, Germany,
too^ must enter the race of imperialistic colonies. Without
overseas expansion Germany could not hope to compete with
other nations or to obtain her great ideal.
From 1871-1876 Bismarck was decidedly unwilling
to encourage any colonial undertakings. His policy, however,
implied a promise and postponement rather than a rejection
of imperial expansion. In the period following, 1876-1884,
the Iron Chancellor played a double game. Secretly and
indirectly he pursued a policy of colonial expansion, but
at the same time he publicly repudiated it. He was feeling
his way cautiously in order not to lose support at home
*Townsend, M.E. p. 60
c]
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or to antagonize the Powers. A notable change in his policy
was obvious in the protective tariffs levied and the new
commercial treaties arranged."^
By 1883, 1884 the Kulturkampf was ended; "revanche"
under the administration of Jules Ferry had practically
disappeared, at any rate, it was no longer a dominating factor
in French foreign policy. Gerr/iany was now able to defy
England, for Bismarck had guaranteed Germany's position in
Europe by means of the Triple Alliance, and the tripartite
agreement of 1881.**
In May, 1682, Bismarck revived the German claims
in the Fiji Islands, which Great Britain had ignored since
1875, without results. Consequently, in 1882 the German
Chancellor assumed a bolder tone and demanded that the
question be submitted to a joint land commission, consisting
of English and German representatives. England seemed
unwilling to consent. Diplomatic correspondence dragged
on with increasing peremptory notes from Bismarck to the
Foreign Office of Great Britain, on October 18, and December
27, 1885, and on April 8, 1884. Ifot until June 19, 1884
did England agree to establish a joint commission. *'^'^
Lord Ampthill had urged Great Britain to take
definite action. "Bismarck is said to feel strongly in the
matter, and to intend to press those claim.s steadily so as
to show Germany that he can protect German interests all
*Tov;nsend, M. E.,P. 62,67
**Townsend, M.E. P. 68,69,85
***Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IV, P. 51-52
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over the world. It ini^ht save future trouble if they coulc!.
be dealt with gracefully ana speedily, so as to leave them
no tiiiie to fet up an agitation about thertu"'^
England's attitude in this affair av/ce public
opinion in Germany to the necessity of annexation in order
to secure adequate protection for commercial interests in
foreign lands. 'This feeling enabled Bismarck to launch a
state-directed colonial policy. V/ithout doubt the coming
election in Berlin influenced the German Chancellor in his
desire to v/in the support of the colonial party, but to my
mind this was something more than a m.ere "political manoeuvre."
With the demand at this time by traders and missionaries
for protection and annexation came also the demand for the
developm^ent of Germian sea power.'*'*
In Africa as well as in the South Seas Great
Britain was pursuing a monopolistic policy. In 168E she
concluded with France a Colonial Convention negotiating a
line of demarcation for the extension of English and French
territories, north from the Sierra Leone. France established
high customs duties, which were bitterly resented by Germian
firms in that region."^**
In 1684 an Anglo-Portuguese treaty was concluded
which established a monopolistic control of the Congo River.
This m.et with great antagonism by Germ.an business interests.
*Lord Ampthill to Lord Granville, Fay 9, 188ii, quoted by
Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, ?. 338
** Townsend, P. 57
***Townsend, ?. 87-88
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Patriotic feeling spread throup-h Germany and. an angered
public sentiment was aroused hostile to Zlriflar d . Bisraarok
immediately sent a orotest to the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty,
April 18, 1884, repudiating its teriris. At the same time
the Ambassador at I'aris wt.s instructed to unite the com.-
mercial interests of France and G-ermany in the Congo against
England
.
On April ^^4, 1884 French support of the i^roposals
of Bismarck was promised. This resulted in the summoning
of a Congo Conference, Hovember 15, 1884. This was an
attempt by Bismarck to isolate England, as far as her coloni
aims in Africa were concerned, by drawir.g nearer to France.
This in turn gave added encouragement to the growing anti-
English sentiment already prevalent in Germany.
'The first ill-feeling in Germany against England
arose as a result of German colonial activities in Southwest
Africa. In Llovember, 168E Luderitz, a German merchant,
had applied for imperial protection over his settlements.
On February 4, 1882 Bismarck addressed a cour-teous note to
England asking if iingland exercised any authority over the
Anga Pequana r«.gion. "If not, Germany intends to afford
her subjects in that region the protection which they need,-
that Germany "had not the least resign of establishing a
foothold in Southwest Africa," and would prefer- to leeve the
responsibility of protection to England. England replied
*Die Groose Politik, Vol. Ill, ?. 437
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to this on February 2'd
,
1:;82), that "the Gape Colony C^overnrnent
has certain establishments along the coast, but without
more precise information as to the exact location of Luderitz'
factory, it is impossible for the British Government to say
whether it could afford this protection in case it were
required."*
This reply was certainly evasive. On Ilovember 4, 1880
Bismarck had asked the British Government to extend protection
to German nissionaries durinr the crisis of a native war.
England had replied, "The British Government cannot accept
responsibility for anything occurring outside of British
terr-itory, which includes only ;»hale Bay and its immediate
region.
"
Great Britain delayed making any reply for nine
months, iuring this interval she urged the Cape Government
to extend their claim to terr-itory beyond the Orange River,
v/hile Luderitz seized the harbor of Ang>,a Pequana and snrround-
ing districts. An answer vvas finally received, however,
from England in November, 188i3 after two reminders from
Bismarck. In this letter Lord Granville stated that any
claim to sovereignty?- or jurisdiction by a foreign power
between Angdila and Gape Colony would infringe Englan:' 's
legitimate rights.
Bismarck now proceeded to notify/ Great "Britain by
a despatch, I-ecember 31, 1883, that Germany contested the
right of any country to exclude others unless prepared to
Townsend, P. 89
t1
-90-
to assert their own territorial jurisdiction and i:-;overeignt,y
,
thus "England establishes a sort of Monroe l;octrine in
Africa against the vicinage of other nations."'^" As Enrland
sent no reply to this note of Lecernber '61 y Bismarck despatched
a proclamation to Luderitz declaring his settlements to
be under imperial protection, '..ith this stroke wat- the
German Colonial Empire .inaugurated, April 24, 1B84.
Great Britain's delay in this matter was partly
due to the need felt by the British Colonial Office, (Lord
Derby) to consult the Cape Colony Government, and by the
failure of the British ministers to recognize Bismarck's
colonial designs. Bismarck's policy was misunderstood to be
mere "election manoeuvres." Granville's ignorance was due
mainly to Lord Ampthill, Ambassador at Berlin, who failed
to appreciate the situation, and pooh-poohec any suggestion
that Bismarck had undertaken an active colonial policy.
Count I unster was also to blame in that he had no sym.pathy
v;ith his country's colonial ambitions, and thus failed to
emphasize the importance of payim^ attention to Germany's
demands
European colonial activity v.as moving on apace on
the west coast of Africa. In 168S to offset French extensions
of territory, iiingland prepared to place British protection
over Baptist missions on the Oil Kivers and Ambas Bay. In
the meantime while the British Consul-GeDeral was delayed
in England, Germany sent out Lr. i^achtigal, on the pretext
of an investigation concerninir German comjnerce on the coast
'^German V/hite Book, June 10, lo84
**I'ie Grosse Politik, l.o. 743
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of V/est Africa. In regard to this rnissioi] the f olD.ov/inf:;:
note was communicated to the British Foreign Qfiice:
"I have the honour to state to Your Lordship that
the Imperial Gonsui-General , Lr. llachtifral, har^ heen comraiEsioned
by lay Government to visit the V.eft Coast of Africa in the
course of the next fev; months, in order to complete the infor-
mation now in the possession of the Foreig-n Office at Berlin
on the state of German cornm.erce on that coast. V/ith this
object, Dr. llachtigal will shortly embark .t Lisbon on board
the gunboat, Mov^e . He will out hii 'self into communication
with the autiiorit ies in the ii^n^^lish possessions on the said
coast, and is authorized to conduct, on behalf of the Imperial
Government, nez/otiations connected v/ith certain question.
I venture, in accordance with my instructions, to be^^ Yo\ir
Excellency to be so good as to cause the authorities in the
British possessions in -Vest Africa to be furnished with suitable
recommendations . "'^
Lord Granville, anxious to maintain :riendly
relations v/ith Germany, gave the n--cessary assurances that
the British authorities should render every possibl;;. assist-
ance to him.
I'uch to the amazement and anger of Great Britain,
Lr. Ilachtigal imm.ediately proceeded to annex territory in
Togo land eastwards to the French settlements beyond the
J.S. Keltic, ?. 200,201
I
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RioCarnpo. Consul -^J-ewitt from Enfland. arrived one week later
in time to secure the Oil xiivers and the mouths of the ITiger,
the ooifimercial key of the situation in that repion, and the
coast \^estward from Rio del Rey to the boundary of Lapos.f
i^either was the territory of East Africa overlooked.
On October 1, 1884 It. Rholfs vms appointed consul for East
Africa, and on February 7, 1885 imperial protection v/as
extended to all lands acquired by the Society of G-erman
Colonization. Thus the protectorates of Kamerun, Togoland
and '£ast Africa vjere added to that of oouthwest Africa.'^
Likewise in the South beas colonial activity x^as not at a
standstill. On !'ay 12, loo4 the C-erman l^ew Guinea Company
was form. ed, financed by the bankers^ von Kansemann, Bleichr^er,
and the Chancellor himself, and an overseas bank established.
Like Lr. I^achtigal, Dr. Finsch v^as sent out to northern
ITew Guinea, osLensibly for scientific purposes, and was
followed by merchants and explorers. Consequently on December
22, 1884, Germ.any proclaimed imperial protection over the
settlements on the north coast of tl.e -^'ew Britain Archipelago.
This naturally aroused opposition in England, but an apreem^ent
was reached in 1885 by which the German imperial protectorates
..ere allowed to include one fourth of I^ev; Guinea, rechristened
Wilhelm.sland ; a group of the Eolomon Islands and other islands
north of Kew Guinea, later naraed Bismarck Archipelaro, and
the Iv'arshall Islands. The F/^-yptian situation had certainly
*Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, !>. 39-41
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provided Bismarck with a lever in her forei^c-n diplomacy."'''
England had not yet paid Bismarck for his moral
support in Egypt. He was determined, however, that this
debt should be paid by i-lnglish acquieKcence to German colonial
expansion. In a forceful note of May b, 1669, the German
Chancellor explained Germany's attitude. " ./e believe
that our attitude toward her (Enp-land's) enemies and rivals
(France and Russia) is of more importance to British policy
than the possession of i^eli^oland and all the trade rivalry
of Germ^an and British firms in distant seas. England can
secure for herself the continuance of our active support for
her political interests throufh sacrifices v.hich she would
hardly feel In makinr" these proposals, we seem in my
opinion, to be offering rather than demanding sacrifice, for
the support, which we can and eventually shall give to England,
is worth in reality more than Heligoland, Fi,ii and Little Popo
put together."'''^
Count l^unster, it v^ould seem from the correspon-
dence which follov.ed, only stressed th.- accession of Heli-
goland to Germany and failed to emphasize the more irportant
section regarding England's attitude to C-erm.any ' s colonial
policy. At any rate, England had misunderstood the policy
Bismarck was pursuing and f eelin-- between the two governnent s
becamie more and m.ore tense. Bismarck held the whip hand,
*Townsend
,
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hovv'ever, and was determined to make the most of it. En^rland
Yms a great sea power Vv'ith immense overseas possessions v^hich
made her the neif;hbor of every counti-y aceesible by sea.
Consequently, she was exposed to friction with these countries
and in danger of findin.^- a combination of ^owers directed
against her. This situation could liave been directed by
skillful diplomacy in a norr^^al period, but all norrnality v;as
removed by an orgy of imperialism, iiingland not onl^^ differed
with Germany,, but also with France in Madagascar and iiigypt,
and with iriussia, who was advancing into central Asia,
The renewal of the Three Emperors League in Ilarch,
1884 allied G-ermany with Russia, Austria and Italy. G-ermany
v«/as also on friendly terms with Turkey and Spain. All that
was needed to complete the ring was France. Friendly
relations between France and Germany i.ere simplified because
of the fact that Ferry was at that tin.e Prime Minister. He
clearly realized that Great Britain was the greatest obstacle
to French expansion and consequently wac willing to co-operate
with Bismarck for the attainment oi certain French colonial
aims
.
The Egyptian Q,uestion in 1884 was in a m.ore critical
condition than ever. The military campaign of lo62 had
increased the financial burden, already too large. • The
English Government was placed between two alternatives, to
reduce the rate of interest on the debt or to bear the
expense of an army of occupation. In April, 1884 the ?ov>/ers
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IV, Ko. 630
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were summoned to a Conference at London to settle the finan-
cial difficulties in Egypt as far as possible. Ferry,
Prime Minister at this time, agreed to attend on the promise
that the British would evacuate Egypt by 1888, to which
promise England agreed, "provided that the powers were of the
opinion that the evacuation could take place without comprom-
ising the peace and order of Egypt." The conference, however,
was doomed to failure. The English proposals called for
a reduction of the interest of the whole debt by one -half
per cent, the floating of a new loan of about eight million
pounds to cover the new indebtedness, and the meeting of the
new interest charges by the transfer of the surplus income
from the assigned revenues to administrative expenditure.
France was opposed to this, and her opposition was loyally
supported by Germany throughout. Thus the Franc o-G-erraan
combination won a great victory.
Because England was in such a delicate position
in Egypt, Gladstone and Granville were unable to hold out
against Bismarck in Africa. On June 26, 1884 after German
sovereignty at Angra Pequana had been recognized by Great
Britain, the treaty with Portugal was abandoned. The Gape
Government was also forced to abandon the idea of annexing
further teiritory in south-west Africa, and on August 22
German sovereignty was claimed over that territory.
The English situation throughout these periods
II
G
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is wittily yet acourately pictured in the following
imaginary dialogue, Prince Bismarck: "rie have helped you
in Egypt, v>/hy not oblige us in i'i^i?" Lord Lerby: "V/e
cannot do it." Lord Granville: "".Ve won't do it." Prince
Bismarck: "But you must do it." Lord Granville: "Very
well, we will tiien."*
Relations between Germany and England showed no
improvement so Bismarcic approached the Prench ambassador at
Berlin for an " equilibriuin of the seas" "I do not v/ant
wslT with England, but I want her to under stnad that if the
navies of the other nations unite, they v/ill counterbalance
2 1
her on the ocean and will comple her to consider the interests
of others. To do this she must accustom^ herself to the idea
that a Pranco-German alliance is not an impossibility."'^*
The idea of such a league created agitation for
increased naval expenditure, and on Lecemiber 2, 1884, Parl-
iament voted five and a half million pounds for the construe,: ion
of new ships during the next five years. The Prench entered
this alliance with open eyes, believing that Bismarcl: v;as only
mal-<-ing use of Prance as a tool tc subdue Great Britain, yet
they were determined to drive a hard bargain and to m.aice the
most of the Germ.an "rapprochements."
November 4, 1864 the question of the Egyptian .
debt was again brought b fore the Powers. The British pro-
*Charles Lowe, The Tale of a Times GorrespjQndent , P. 205
as quoted by Langer, P. SOI
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posals •<H%^ settlement were rejected and international control
substituted for financial control by England, ^iingland was
helpless in viev; of the international situation. Bismarck
Vi/aited until Ferry had proffered counter-proposals to the
English proposals in January 8, 1885 and then supported the
French plan.
English statesmen as well as French realized that
Bismarck v^as using France to isolate completely Great
Britain. For example, Lord Lyons states, "Bismarck and Ferry
are'^ouant au plus fin With each other at our expense. Each
seem.s to think that he can use the other to help in thv^arting
us, ¥,?ithout risk to himself. But Bismarck has the best of
the game. He occupies the I'rench thoughts and to some
extent their forces, at a distance from Europe; he keeps
up imitation betv/e-.n them, and us^ and some of the acquisitions
he encourages them to make vjill in all probability be a
permanent cause of weakness to them. At the same time he
neutralizes opposition from us to his childish colonial
schemes, which I cannot help suspecting are founded as
much on v/hat, for want of a better v.ord, 1 m.ust call spite
against us, as on an\r real expectation of advantage to Germany.
Ferry hopes, by means of Bismarck and the powers who follow
Bismarck's lead, to carry his immediate point in regard to
Egypt and other parts of the world, and so increase liis
reputation at home for the m.oment , and he trusts to skill
to enable him to stop before he has so alienated us as to be
I
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quite at Bisniarcit's mercy. It is the national disposition
of almost all Europe to side a^t?;ainst us, as matters stnad.
,
on the Egyptian financial question, v/hich mal-ces this pretty
game possible."*
Bismarclc carried on a very bitter and hostile
Press V/ar betv.een the two countries, England and Germany.
To climax the results of this nevi/soaper v/ar, colonial and
international events played into 3ismarcic. 's hand. In
Kamerun revolts had broken out betvi/een the natives and Germans.
This v.c-.s reported to have been stirred up by the English,
although no real proof was found to support this statement.
Furthermore, a Pole, Rogezinsky by name, a perfectly innocent
trader in the ICamerun was denouced as a British agent, and
a formal repudiation of him demanded from Great Britain.
As a counter stroke, Lord Lerb^'' sent H.K. Goshawk
to plant the British flag at Lucia Bay and ordered Sir Charles
Vvarren to Bechuanaland to prevent the way north .ard being
blocked by German possessions. Miction was again r^ sumed in
Hew Guinea by Great Britain, and the rest of the Island not
under German protect ion^ was claimied for Great Britain.
The international situation, likewise aided Bism.arck
in his aggressive policy. The Egyptian Question v/as in a
more critical condition than ever.
In February, lb85 a Berlin Conference was held
*Hewton, Lord: Lord Lyons, Vol. II, P341
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which quelled any hopes on the part of the Enp-lish for a
monopoly over the Conf'o. This meeting recognized BeJ'^lurn's
International Association of the Congo. Hereafter the
Congo V7as to be open to trade of all countries alike. Another
im'tortant decision made necessary the occupation of territory
before any substantial claim could be out forward. Further-
more, relations between England and Germany were exceedingly
tense as a result of a tactless speech by Granville.
Bisraarclc, however, did not intend that the state of affairs
should reach the breaking point, and in I'arch, 1B85, Herbert
Bismarck v/as sent on a special mission to London in order to
settle the feud. The results of this trip v;ere satisfactory
and Gladstone , never an imperialist, exclaimed in the Kouse
of Commons on llarch 12: "If Germany is to become a colonizing
pov^er, all 1 say is "God Speed Her I" She becomes our ally
and partner in the execution of the great purposes of
Providence for the advantage of mai.kind."'^
Events in Egypt had made possible the truce. The
fall of Khartoum and Gordon's death at the hands of the
Mahdi vveakene.. still m.ore England's prestige and strengthened
the hostility of France. On February 12, Russia's arm.y \?as
at the gates of Herat, threatening the boundaries of India.
England could not afford to offend Germany any longer.
Reconciliation with England also became expedient for
Germany. The year 1885 marked the fall of the Ferry Government
in France, and the rise of a more aggressive German policy
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under Clentanoeau, especially noticeable in the spread of
Boulanfisni. The year 1885 also witnessed the downfall of
Gladstone and the appearance of a more congenial person
in Lord Salisbury. BismarciL readily recognized the destruction
of the rapprochement with France. Great Britain had alre^,dy
begun to yield to Germany's claim.s even before a change had
talien place in the British Cabinet as seen in Gladstone's
speech m.entioned above.
Fmrthermore, a definite agreement had been reached
in regard to Hew Guinfea in Januarjr, 1885 and in 1886 the
"fail accompli" in East Africa was recognized by England.
A more serious crisis arose at this time when on
I'arch 30 Russian troops defeated an Afghan force at Pendjeh,
threatening the borders of India. Russia assured Sngland
that she did not intend to increase her territory, but failed,
however, to keep these promises. In February 1884 I'erv
was incorporated by Russia which brought Russian Territory
almost if not quite to the boundary of the Afghan Territory,
the exact limits of which were not known. A joint comr::iEGion
was now appointed to determire the frontier. Sir r'eter
Lumsden was sent as the British representative and General
^elevoi, for Russia. Zelevoi, U-e««^5ar, failed to appear,
having developed a "diplomatic illness". Because of Russia's
dilatory action it was feared that a iiussian advance directed
against India was planned and that this policy was supported
by BismarcJt.*
Fitzmaurice, Granville, Vol. II, ?. 421-4^2
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Bismarck in all probability did not actually work to cause
a conflict between Russia and England, but doubtless he
did not feel the desire to straighten out the difficulties
after the attitude England had taken in regard to a German
colonial policy.
On March 30, Russian troops defeated the Afghans
and occupied Pend^eh. The v;ithdrawal of English troops from
the Sudan became necessary in order that British forces would
not be scattered in case a crisis arose. Lord Roseberry was
sent to Germany to attempt to arrange for united action in
Central Asia. Bismarck was frank in his attitude that for the
Sultan to allow free passage of ships, would mean a state
of war between Russia and Turkey. Austria, France, and Italy
were induced to support the German policy. From the Germ.an
document it would seem as if England had offered to allow
Turkey to occupy Egypt and the Suez, as well as a free hand
in Bulgaria in return for opening the Straits to English
warships,* No reference to such has been noticed in British
papers.
Bismarck^ s attitude showed that he intended to
support the League of the Three Emperors at all accounts.
Such a policy was not only of help to Russia, but to
European peace as well. The German Chancellor did not Vv-ant
war, for there was, as always, the fear that such a conflict
could not be localized and would embroil Germany.
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. VII, No. 1376

-102-
His aim vms rather to keep the relatioxis between En^c^land and
France and betv.een Sn^rland and itussia in such a state of
rivalry as to prevent a coalition against Germany, and in
order to make G-erman support an essential factor.
V/ar seemed to become -lore and more unavoidable
when the govern ents of Enfland and Russia be^an to negotiate
directly/ v.lth each other in re.p-ard to the d elim.itation of
the Affhan frontier. l«efot iations had not been com.pleted
when the Gladstone Ministry fell on June 9, 1585^ Lord
Salisbury concluded the negotiation and si£rned an agreement
in September 1886. As mentioned above, udth the advent of
the Conservative Iiinistry under Lord Salisbury, a reconcil-
iation betv/een iingland and German3?- became much easier.
V/ith the fall of Ferry and the arrival of yreyciriCt , the
Franco-German entente disappeared. The summer of 1885
revealed a clianged European system of relat 1 onshi os
.
England's policy under Granville righteously
arouses one's indi -nation . On ail sides then had been a
failure to appreciate the situation, rio co-operation with
the German colonization policy 'vvas secured from England,
consequently Bism.arck Y^as forced to turn to x^rance, not from
choice but as a matter of necessity. "Bismarck found the
entente with Fr: nee useful. The continental coalition was
for the m.oment a reality, and England was helpless. Oertrinly.
she ;vas the strongeLt naval power in the world, but the
(i
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British fleet oould not sail to Paris or Berlin, the more so
as they were threatened by a possible coalition of naval
forces on their own element. This factor must not be left
out of account, for it explains how Bismarck and Ferry^
throufi-h purely political methods, were able to paralyze
British sea power and establish great colonial empires
without having individually really powerful navie^. The
British government that was responsible for this turn of
events pursued a policy more disastrous than it could know,
for the year IcSS m.arks the end of England's unquestioned
preeminence in the colonial field. She was no lonjC^er the
one real world pov/er. The others had acquired extra-Iilurupean
interests, and the new colonies were born under the evil
omen of antagonism to England. V/ith nev; footing- abroad
the other powers were in a better position than ever- to bring
pressure upon England. She was more exposed to attack
than before. From this time on, the policy of splendid iso-
lation was already oasse. For some time yet the jolicy
was maintained at least in theory, but if the isolation
remained, the splendour was gone."*
IX The Eastern Question i^ Reopened.
Another continental crisis received attention
*Langer, P. ol8
(9
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in 1885 in Buls'aria. Both Austria and Russia had been
striving to increase their influence in the Balkans
politically and economically. On October 30, 1883, Roumania
agreed to an alliance with Austria, Germany also signed this
threaty, which, with several renewals lasted until the
World War.*
A commercial treaty was also signed between Serbia
and Austria, while Austrian relations with Greece were
also very friendly. In 1882 Abdul Hamid had expressed a
desire for an alliance with Austria and Germany. Such an
idea was unthinkable, as it would involve the central powers
in the hostility between Turkey and Russia. German officers
were, nevertheless, sent to Constantinople to help reorganize
the Turkish army.
In the meanwhile, Russia had staked her claims on
Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, a German prince, and
favorite nephew of the Tsar had been chosen as hereditary
Prince in 1879. On the death of Alexander II in 1881, the
affection felt for the Russian Tsar disappeared and it v;as
thought by many that Alexander was working for a union of
Balkan states as against Russian influence. Alexander
hoped for support from the Powers against the Pan-Slavs,
but it was not forthcoming. In a visit to Berlin in 1883
Alexander had fallen in love with Princess Victoria, daue-hter
of the German Crown Prince, Frederick. Her mother was a
*For text of treaty, see Pribram, Secret Treaties, Vol.
I, P 78
i
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daughter of Queen Victoria. Bismarck immediately saw in
this an attempt on the part of Queen Victoria to cause
a rupture between Germany and Russia. Before the affair
v;as made public, the German Chancellor had forced a negative
decision and assurances v/ere sent to the Tsar accordingly.
While Alexander was attempting a reconciliation with Russia,
events took the matter out of his hands. A revolt broke
out in Eastern Roumania and on September 18, Alexander was
forced to proclaim the union of Bulgaria.
Lord Salisbury, at the head of the nev; Conservative
Government in England, pointed out that as England had
insisted in the division of Bulgaria in 1878, she could not
now take the lead in tearing it up. A large Bulgaria
disturbed the balance of power in the Balkans and a conflict
broke out in August between Serbia and Bulgaria, ending in
a victory for the latter. Serbia relied on Austria for
support in this war. Such action would, however, be certain
to bring Russia on the scene. Bismarck warned Austria that
she could not count on German support for her forward
policy in Serbia.*
Bismarck's strong stand calmed the situation and
negotiations were opened on the basis of a personal union.
The Salisbury Cabinet had surrendered to another Gladstone
Cabinet, February 6, 188&, consequently the Bulgarian claims
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IV, ITo. 786
t
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were not pressed, and Russia had her own way in the settlement.
On March 3, 1886, the status quo was restored by the Treaty of
Bucarest. Several months later, Alexander of Battenberg was
kidnapped and on September 7, he formally abdicated. Although
Russia was not known to be definitely implicated in the kidnap-
ping, she did work to cause his abdication. England immediately
warned Russia that any occupation of Bulgaria by Russian troops
might lead to summons of the English fleet to the Black Sea.
Lord Salisbury was angered over this turn of events. "I do not
know what to say or think about Alexander. It is disappointing
and very disastrous. Everything points to the belief that it
is Bismarck's doing, who has taken to answering us almost as
briefly and brutally as the Czar answers the Prince."*
Any definite action on the part of Russia was
watched carefully by Austria and England, and an agreement be-
tween England and Austria suggested. Austria declared, "she
would be delighted to take the first step as Lord Salisbury
proposes, if Lord Salisbury will begin by taking the second."**
Bism.arck's position v/as also very dangerous, while doing his
utmost to restrain Austria, he insisted to Russia that Germany
would never stand aloof and allow the position of Austria to
be threatened.
Meanwhile, in France the national movement under
Boulanger continued to spread, harboring the idea of "revanche"
and efforts were made to win the sympathy of Russia by an offer
of support in Bulgaria. A very bitter press campaign was waged
in both France and Germany and it was though that at any time
war would break out between France and Germany. Count
Hatzfeldt came to Lord Salisbury on January
*Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. IV, ?. 1
**I)ilke, Sir Charles, Europe in 1887, P. 23
if
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23, 1S84 to discuss this situation. From this it v/as learned
that England would remain cuite neutral.
In 1886 negotiations had oeen brourht forward
for an Austro-Englisu -tilliance. Since, however, Austria
Yi/ould not t ive the initiative in the Balkan crisis, no
ajcrreement "wa£ reached. Tension arose s.t this time betvveen
France and England over Egypt. Consequently, Y;hen Bismarck
emphasized the importance of an alliance with England to
Itsly, the proposals v/ere received more v/illingly as an
increased source of strenp-th in the I',:editerranean
.
Luring negotiations for the rene^7al of the Triple
Alliance in 1886 it "/as seen that in orc'er to maintain the
adherence of Italy to the treaty, Germany would be forced
to support Italy in her i-editerranean policy. Therefore,
Bismarck v/as e- ger for English co-operation with the contin-
ental povvers. Bismarcis. "feared Austria's weakness and
England's inertia" in tLe Eastern Crisis. "Turkey, under
English guidance, with Italy and Austria and the Balkan
states, would indeed be strong enough to resist Russia and
overcome her. Germany would then be able to fight both France
and Russia without fear, and the Eastern Question would be
solved once and for all."*
Lord Salisbury recognizing the danger England
faced in her isolated position undertook negotiations with
*Letters of Queen Victoris, Third Series, ?. 246 as quoted
by Langer, ?. 397-S98
1
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Italy. In a letter to Q,ueen Victoria, he wrote: "If, in
the present grouping of nations, which Prince 3isrnarck tells
us is nov; tailing place, England v;as left out in isolation,
it mifht well happen that the adversaries, who are coming
against each other on the Continent, might treat the English
Empire as divisible booty, by which their differences might
be adjusted, and, though England could defend herself, it
would be at a fearful risii and cosu."^
Negotiations with Italy were begun on this basis
and the final draft of the Anglo -Italian agreement signed
on February 20, 1887. This agreement represented a connecting
link between England and the Triple Alliance. Austria
declared her adhesion to this paol) on Larch 24. At this tirr.e
the old treaty of the Triple Alliance was renewed for five
years, until I'ay 20, 189 L'. In addition it was supplemented
by new '3-erman Italian and Austro-Italian agreements ,
^
Behind all these com.licated negotiations stands
the figure of Bismarct. 3y lay, 1887 France was completely
surrounded by members of a coalition determined to maintain
the status quo and to prevent her from taking action.
X England and Germany 1888-1890.
Luring the first half of the year 1668 the attention of the
^Letters of ^ueen Victoria, Vol. I, ?. 271-272 as quoted by
Langer, P. o&l.
**Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, Vol. IV, P. 77; Pribram,
Vol. I, P. 115, 124-1S3
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world was fixed on the pascinf the leadership of the German
Empire from V/illiarr. I to Fredericic III and after a brief
period from Frederick III to the inexperienced 'alliam II.
On March 9 Williani I died. Frederick III then critically
ill resumed the leadership of the Empire until June 15 ?/hen
he too died. The new Emperor V/illiaqi II, Queen Victoria's
eldest grandson, expressed his intention of contiriiinf- the
home and foreign policy of his grandfather, William I.'''
The one great problem of Germ.an policy in these last
years of 3ismarci:'a politic;^l career was to maintain the
balance betv;een England and her allies on the one hand and
Russia and France on the other. The Ger:rian Chancellor
had skillfully manipulated this delicate situation, which
becarae even more complex throu/^li th-j death of Emperor
V/illiaiji I. The brief reign of Frederick III threatened to
upset the balance of Gerran foreign policy. A greater
proble'!^:, however, was the management of the young Crown
Prince, './illiam v^ho had certain prejudices and viev/s of
his ovm.
When v/illiam. II ascended the throne in June 1S88,
he was regarded ivith suspicion in France and Russia. Further-
more, the neYi Emperor had little sym.pathy for England or his
English relatives. From certain indiscreet rem.arks of the
Prince of wples an estrangement betw een the tv.o fa-dlies took
'^Letters of Q,ueen Victoria, 3rd Series, Vol. I, P. 370
t
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place . *
Lord Salisbury v/as determined that this coolness
between the reigning families should not affect the political
relations of iingland and Germany. Lorcl Salisbury did not
share the fear of Queen Victoria that ii^ngland would find
herself isolated in iiiuropean affairs. For example: "The
alliance v/ith Austria covers the only weak point in the
i^nglish position" Y/rote Lord Salisbury to the Queen.
"Ko foreign pov/ers (setting aside France for the nonent) are
in a position to threaten England's interests, except
Russia by striking at Constantinople. If Austria—that is
to say rlungary—could be induced to view vjith equanimity
the seizure of the Bosphorus by Russia, the English position
v/ould be very difficult; as England would have to defend
the Bosphorus by herself; for Russia can always purchase the
Germany
complicity of Italy and/by consenting to allow them to
do what they like with France. But, so long as Austria
stands firm upon this point, Germany, and consequently
Italy, m.ust go with her. To England, therefore, for the
moment, the most important question is, .Vhat is the disposition
of Austria? As far as we can form a ^ud^roent, her disposition
was never more favorable. If this view be cor-rect, there
is nothing to disquiet England in the meetings of Emperors
of Ministers France is, and must always remain,
*Letters of Queen Victoria, 5rd Series, Vol I, 421-4;l'3
438-4S1
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England's greatest danger. 3ut that danger is dormant, so
long as the present strained relation exists betv;een H'rance
and her two E-istern neighbors. If France should ever be
on friendly terms with their;, the Army and l^avy estimates
v;ould rise very rapidly."'^
The international situation during these months
was outwardly fairly quiet. liew transaetlons betv;een St.
Petersburg and Rome, were, hov/ever, very disturbing to
Germany. In 1689, Russia placed a lar^p-e order for the new
French rifle, after definite assurance had been pledged that
they would never be used agairist France.
I^Iew financial connoctions v/ere
,
also, at this time
established b".;tween Russia and France, which built up the
huge indebtedness of Russia to France in the period before
the vvorld V/ar and created a strong financial tie between
the two countries . '^"^
As a result of thiL renev;ed danger, Bismarck
turnec again to i:iriglai.d. In August 1888, the Chancellor
had pointed out that, because of Fngland'^y military and
naval unpreparedness , her only assurance against French attacic
lay in good relations v.ith Germany. Germany could effectively
hold France in check, but only if she were certain that
England v;ould st"5nd by the League of Peace in the event of
Russia's supporting France. These ideas were developed wife
*Letters of Queen Victoria, 2rc! Series, Vol. I, P. 437-438
'^''Langer, W. S. ?. 491-492
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I-Iatzfeldt durinfr his stay at FriedricksruHft from January
5 to 7, 1889 . They Vi/ere worked out in the instructions sent
to the Ambassador after his returr; to London. Ilatzfeldt
vi/as to Gonmunicate to Lore! Salisbury the desirability of a
treaty betv;een the two countri.es. This treaty v/as to be
XDublic as a more certain guarantee of preventing war.
"Once it is clearly understood that England would be protected
against a i'rench attack by a Gerriian alliance and Germany
against a French attack by an English alliance, 1 consider
the peace of Surope assured for the duration of such a
published treaty'.'*
Lord Salisbury seriously considered these proposals
:jut post -'Oiied communicating them, to the Foreign Office or to
the Queen. The Queen v/as never informed of the&e overtures,
and British documents and papers shov; no evidence of a pro-
posal for an alliance with Germ.any. ^^evertlieless attempts
were made in 1689 for a closer understanding betv/een the two
countries.
On March 21, 6ount Herbert Bismarck came to London
to settle the Samoan question and other minor difficulties.
Lord Salisbury reported to Count Bismarck that an Aru-lo -German
alliance had found favorable support amonrest his colleagues
but that fi;e time was not yet ripe to proceed more definitely.
"^Lie Grosse Politik, Vol. IV, P. 400. iiinglish translation by
E. Dugdale.
{
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"meanwhile, v;e leave it on the table, without sayinr yes
or no; that is unfortunately all I can do at present.""^
Relations were irnpiroved still more during the
spring and sum-fier when Lord Salisbury and Court Bismarck
came to an agreement over Samoa and '£ast Africa. F\irther
expressions of goodwill were exchanged in a conversation
between Count Bismarck and Chamberlain. The latter suggested
a transfer of German Southwest Africa for Heligoland.
"Katurally," stated 'Chamberlain, "we cannot suggest .your
makinr a present of that Colony to liingland. There must be
compensation, What do you think if we gave you Heligoland
instead which is useless for England and perhaps v/orth having
for you, were it but for thj prestige?"*'^
T'oreover, at this time a rtconciliation too!^ place
between the Imperial families of England and Germ.any on an
invitation to the young Emperor to visit London. This visit
resulted in a joint naval demonstration as .>illiam v/as
accompanied by a German squadron, and received the title
Admiral of the British fleet.
Although Bismarck was delighted at the improvement
of relations between England and Germany, he.:-did not intend
that they should disturb relations with Russia. Here we
have the beginning of antagonism between the old Chancellor
and the young Emperor. Tension increased between the two
*Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IV, ITo 945
*'^i;ie Grosse .^olitik, Vol. IV, No. 946-949
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over domestic policy, but the complete break was a result
of the Emperor's foreign policy in regard to Russia.
Bismarck was dismissed. Meantime, negotiations had been
going on for a renewal of the secret Re-Insurance Treaty
of 1885. William II assured the Russian ambassador that
the dismissal would not mean a change of policy. However,
the new Chancellor, influenced by Holstein of the Foreign
Office, advised the Emperor of the advisability of the
non-renewal of the Re-Insurance Treaty and William agreed.
Bismarck was gone and with him was destroyed one
of the "pivotal agreements" of his complex system. His
successors neither understood nor dared to continue his
intricate prop-ram. Kis alliances were strictly defensive,
except perhaps for a slight inclination to aggression in the
German-Italian Treaty of 1887. Bismarck's primary object
was not only to isolate France, but to protect German
frontiers. This he attempted to do by turning the attention
of European Powers to colonial fields and by a system of
protective agreements. Germany was the center of gravity
in all of these agreements, with two distinct hostile
groups, one directed against France, the other against
Russia. In these alliances England could depend on Germany
in case of a war against France, but in a war between England
and Russia, German support under Bismarck was uncertain.
Bismarck's dismissal could, therefore, be regarded without
c
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emotion in the hope of a closer rapprocheraent "between
England and Germany under William II and Bismarck's
successor, Count Gaprivi.

(1)
General Comprehensive Summary
On January 21, 1871 the German Empire was proclaimed.
The war with France had been fought without outside interfer-
ence. Not only during the v/ar, but during the negotiations
for peace England remained aloof, except for insisting that
Belgian neutrality be strictly observed. Bismarck, in order
to maintain the system he had created, now sought to guarantee
its security by overtures to Russia and Austria. This resulted
in a monarchical entente of 1872, and later in 1872 the
Dreikaiserbudn, or the League of the Three Emperors.
The first definite intervention in European
politics on the part of England came in 1875, when Disraeli
was Prime Minister. Many in England believed that Bismarck
had decided to crush France once and for all. Hot only
Lord Derby, but also the Queen had received information
by which they were generally convinced that tht-re was a
real danger of war. Bismarck was annoyed at these "unjust"
suspicions. Especially was he angry when he learnt that
St. Petersburg and London had taken identical action to
preserve pe^ce, and that Austria had also been invited to
participate in ^oint intervention. Undoubtedly in 1875 a
hostile sentiment was aroused against France, But Bismarck's
implication is not clear.
At this time, 1875, revolt broke out in the Balkans.
#€
Directly Great Britain had no interest in the respective
claims of Greece, Seroia, Bulgaria, Rouraania or Montenegro.
Indirectly they were of primary importance because the future
of the Turkish Empire was involved, and with that the control
of the road to India, a factor always in the foreground of
British policy. A rising in the Balkans would probably
bring about the intervention of Austria and Russia. Doubt-
less the ancient claims of Russia for possession of Constan-
tinople and for the opening of the Straits would be renewed.
If the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were open to Russian vmrships,
the naval position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean
would be greatly endangered.
Bismarck and Germany professed to have no interests
in Balkan affairs, except the preservation of peace between
Austria and Russia. Previously peace had been maintained
by the Dreikaiserbund , an informal understanding between the
three Emperors. This security was destroyed by the increasing
hostility and rivalry between Russia and Austria. The years
between 1876-1878 was a period in which Bismarck worked to
prevent the outbreak of war between Austria and Russia. He
also offered to give his services as mediator between England
and Russia early in 1878, and thus helped to remove the
difficulties, which threatened to prevent a meeting of
European Plenipotentiaries at a Congress to be held at Berlin.
Throughout the negotiations, Bismarck alsone displayed sound
judgment in regard to the East. His plan was the partition
€
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of the Ottoman Empire, in regard to the spheres of
influenoe of each country.
The year 1878 marks a turning point in European
history, Russia resorted to threats in an attempt to force
Germany to side with her in the East. Partly because of
Russia's hostile attitude at the close of the Congress there
resulted the Dual Alliance, which became the Triple Alliance
by the incorporation of Italy. This agreement remained the
basis of the European situation down to 1914.
From 1871 to 1890 it is perfectly evident that all
of Bismarck's clever diplomatic manipulations centered around
the one aira--the preservation of the peace of Europe.
Germany had gained all that she desired in 1871, The
supreme need was to maintain what had been won. In France
and Russia only there seemed to exist the danger of \^ar.
To offset the ambitions of Pan-Slavs in the Balkans which
might bring about war v/ith Austria, Germany had entered
into a defensive alliance with Austria, Russia and
France were the only countries on the Continent with whom
England had any serious differences.
f
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Why, then, not come to some definite understanding with
Germany? Bismarck constantly argued that if it were known
in France that an attack on Germany would bring about a war
with England and vice versa; peace would be secured.
Russia's attitude became more conciliatory at that
time, fearful, perhaps, lest she find herself isolated and
overtures to England were dropped with little chance of their
renewal at the fall of the Conservative Ministry.
In 1878 a new field of activity was opened in
Egypt. The first step had been the pruchase of shares in
the Suez Canal by Disraeli in 1875. The tangled financial
situation led to intervention in internal affairs and the
establishment of Dual Control bv France and England. A
succession of events led in 1883 to the military occupation
of Egjrpt by England. The British Government found itself
alone in Egypt faced by the hostility of France. Bismarck
now was in a position to support England in a successful
executnion of her policy or to impede her progress. He
chose to be helpful. As early as 1876 he had suggested
Egypt to England as her Sphere of influence in case of the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
Germany was to receive compensation, however, for
her benevolent attitude towards England in Egypt. In 1884
Bismarck openly pursued a colonial policy. This was not such
a sudden and remarkable change of heart as many seem to
c
think. As early as 1879 he had given support to German
merchants and traders in foreign lands, but indirectly
in order not to incur the hostility of other Powers. The
British Government under Gladstone failed to appreciate
this, in the belief that this new policy was merely an
"election manoeuvre." Bismarck was angered at the dilatory
attitude of England and stated that if the British Government
wished to continue to receive support in Egypt, they must
fully meet his wishes in regard to New Guinea, Angra Pequana,
and Zanzibar.
The German Chancellor now approached France and
expressed his desire for a close entente with France. The
danger of an Anglo-Russian alliance under Gladstone doubtless
gave added encouragement to a better understanding ¥/ith France.
Bismarck may also have wished to show that if England did
not conform to his wishes, she would find herself opposed by
a general European coalition.
At this time, war between Russia and England
threatened to break out at any minute, because of the Pend^eh
incident in Asia. It was believed that England planned to
send a fleet through the Dardanelles in violation of the
Treaty of Paris of 1856, should war with Russia break out.
At any rate, Bismarck took the lead in urging the European
Po?/ers as well as France to support Turkey in keeping the
Dardanelles closed.
f
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In March, 1885, the Ferry Government fell, which
put an end to a rapprochement with Germany. Soon after an
attempt at conciliation with England was endeavored. This
was aided by a return to power of the Conservative Ministry
under Lord Salisbury, An exchange of friendly greetings
immediately took place. The policy of friendliness was
not interfered with by the short Liberal Ministry with
Lord Roseberry as Foreign Secretary.
V/ith the return of the Conservative Government and
the prospect of a long tenure in office, close co-operation
between England and Germany was resumed. In 1887 Lord
Salisbury entered agreements with Austria and Italy. These
arrangements expressed the conmiunity of interests and
identical purpose of the Po\''ers concerned, but anything in
the nature of a binding treaty agreement was avoided.
Nevertheless, they form an important liak in co-operating
with the Triple Alliance as against France and Russia.
These agreements were carried on with such secrecy that
their existence was not known until published in 1920.
At the conclusion of these negotiations with
Austria and Italy, an exchange of notes took place between
Lord Salisbury and Bismarck. Soon after there is a formal
offer of an alliance made officially by the German
Ambassador. Ho definite answer was given to this. A few
months after and Bismarck was dismissed; proposals for
an alliance were not renewed for nearly ten years.
4
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